February 24, 1781. Lt. Col. Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee, Virginia patriot leader of cavalry and light infantry, rode before four hundred North Carolina loyalists. The militia, eager to join British Lt. General Charles Cornwallis’ army, had lined up for review. With Lee’s cavalry by his side, the Continental Army commander was enthusiastically greeted by the unit’s commander, fifty-eight year old Colonel (Dr.) John Pyle; an Alamance County physician loyal to the crown who had actively raised these men to fight for the king. Lee paused a moment to admire Pyle’s militia, drawn up in review with their weapons harnessed or slung over their shoulders. As he shook the doctor’s hand, he smiled. Pyle eyed the impressive cavalryman in green uniform and immaculate trim, that of a British dragoon. He returned Lee’s complements in kind saying, “Colonel Tarleton, it is a pleasure to meet you.” Within moments the killing began.
Accounts vary as if Lee had intended to capture the loyalist militia or do them harm. When it was over, reports of between ninety-one and ninety-nine militiamen lay dead, slashed to the bone by sword or hurled from their mounts by close-order musket blasts. Up to two hundred more were horrifically wounded. Those spared the slaughter were allowed to escape. To spread the word. Death awaited those who answered England’s call to arms. The Battle of Haw River, or as the British called it, Pyle’s Massacre, proved, by the Battle of Guilford Courthouse less than three weeks later, a game changer that.
In the past month, things had turned sour for Lt. General Charles Cornwallis. He received his first real stomach punch of the southern campaign from American Brigadier General Daniel Morgan at Cowpens, January 17, 1781. The crafty rifleman put Cornwallis’ darling boy Banastre Tarleton over his knee while destroying the flamboyant cavalryman’s command, among them the elite 71st Highlanders. Prior to that there had been one blip in Cornwallis’ plans. British Major Patrick Ferguson, with some South Carolina militia, threatened and then attempted to push aside a bunch of ‘over the mountain men’ at the Battle of King’s Mountain on Oct. 7, 1780. He got himself killed instead, along with his loyalist militia scattered. But the real blow came that cold day in February. The annihilation of the North Carolina militia under Pyle resulted in destroying England’s hopeful reliance on Scottish and Irish loyal militia flocking to their banner. That one brutal and vicious skirmish along a little known creek, in which droves of loyalists were mercilessly cut down, even as they tried to surrender, served as a warning. All those who even thought of fighting alongside the redcoats would be shown no mercy. And as such, this action demonstrated that in the south, the Revolution had become a ‘gloves off’ civil war in which there would be no quarter.
Background
Before Cowpens, things were pretty rosy for those in red. By 1780, in the two years since France entered the war, the French navy had little or no effect against British operations in America. A threat by patriot and French forces to a large British posting at Newport, Rhode Island in the summer of 1778 was thwarted, mainly with the help of nature ruining the French fleet before they could land troops. That same summer, the new British Supreme Commander General Henry Clinton gave up Philadelphia which had proven to be an albatross. Clinton returned to his base of power in New York City and quietly waited while the rebellion wilted in a slow death of its own making.
Yes, the French landed a sizable force at Newport, Rhode Island on July 11, 1778, yet her fleets were ineffective, bottled up in Europe by England’s powerful navy. And Washington? All he could do is confine himself to saber rattling while trying to hold his army together. The American cause as well as their army was sputtering. The rebellion was losing support. It became a war that was too costly, it drove up inflation on currency that was proving more and more useless, and it morphed into an enterprise whose favor had dwindled to less than a third of the population; while remaining patriots were second guessing the whole affair. Of the army; recruits were down, there was little in the way of supplies, Congress was broke, men hadn’t been paid in years, and with no major victories to spur the patriot fervor that had initially fueled the revolution, men began to lay aside their muskets and leave for home.
War Heads South
Though the prize of total victory remained elusive, the British had retained high expectations and mobility. The southern colonies endured as the bread basket of American wealth. There, Scottish and Irish immigrants settled in huge numbers and most had remained loyal to the crown. Savannah, Georgia had been captured in December 1778 and in the fall a year later, defended itself against a strong Franco/American force. The writing was on the wall. All Clinton had to do was use a portion of his large professional army to invade the south. He did so, departing New York the day after Christmas, 1779. After a two month siege, he claimed Charleston, South Carolina on May 12, 1780. A handsome reward that had escaped him in 1776.
To sweeten the deal, Clinton captured the largest military force of the war, almost the entire American southern army under the indecisive Major General Benjamin Lincoln; a pleasant man better suited as a librarian than warrior. Before Clinton turned the invasion over to his rival, Lt. General Cornwallis, he gave orders to chase down the last of the pesky Americans. Then set up a series of outposts, particularly along the interior, which the loyalist militia would man. With the wealth of supplies garnished from the invasion, Clinton was convinced a red tide would flow into Virginia from both the south and from the east by troops transported from New York. It would be the final stake driven into the heart of America’s misguided revolt. Indeed, the start of 1781 was promising. Who’d have ever guessed that in the next eight months, the entire British cause would plunge into a fatal abyss.
General Cornwallis Left in Charge
After General Henry Clinton departed for New York on June 5, 1780, Cornwallis put in motion a plan to both smash any trifling resistance from the remnants of the southern army, and quell marauding patriot militia, especially those under Colonel Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion and later Colonel Thomas Sumter. He had his pit bull Colonel Banastre Tarleton readily at hand to service this mission nicely. Tarleton commanded a partisan legion of loyalists – both cavalry and light infantry troops. His cold hearted brutality became legendary at the Battle of Waxhaws, May 29, 1780, in which his Legion massacred dozens of Continental troops under Colonel Abraham Buford who had tried to surrender. However, the local resistance remained a nuisance. Marion and Sumter had become a bit more difficult as their guerrilla tactics were proving harmful. But no matter, Cornwallis started setting up inland outposts as commanded; from Augusta in Georgia, to Ninety Six and Camden in South Carolina.
By mid-summer 1780, Major General Horatio Gates showed up with 1,400 battle hardened Continentals from Maryland and Delaware to pull together the remnants of the southern army. He scraped together some local patriotic militia; however, his incompetence doomed the small army. The Battle of Camden on August 16, 1780 not only resulted in defeat, but near entire annihilation of his worn down force. This opened the way for Cornwallis to widen his influence and convince the hesitant loyalists that the future lay with England. Things were going as planned, that is until General Washington got his way and pushed his own man through Congress to take the helm of the southern army, or what was left of it. On December 3rd, 1780, Major General Nathanael Greene showed up in North Carolina to take command of America’s best hope in the south from the dishonored Gates. This one move by Washington proved to drill a nail in the coffin that would bury England’s desire to retain the American colonies.
Major Nathanael Greene Maintains His Army at All Costs
Greene’s greatest assets were his determination and his mobility. In the hands of this strong minded, unbending Rhode Island Quaker, the southern army was quickly molded into a fighting unit. Discipline was strict – the first man he caught not doing his duty was immediately executed. It was his all or nothing firmness and acceptance of war as brutally violent that infected those under his command to do likewise. Pitted against Cornwallis, Greene would win, anyway he could. Having a weakened force, he would hit his opponent hard using guerrilla tactics then draw back rapidly. Above all else, he would maintain his army and not allow it to be drawn into a full scale battle that would cut it to pieces as Gates had done at Camden. Greene would stay one march ahead of is enemy, wear him down, turning from time to time to snap at Cornwallis’ heels in pointed raids. Only when Greene was strong enough and on ground that met his terms, would he hold firm and do battle.
The Race was on and Greene Crossed the Dan River into Virginia
After the Battle of Cowpens in late January, Cornwallis was fuming to catch his elusive enemy. He ordered the wagons to be burned and all supplies not necessary for a rapid march to be left behind. So began a race of attrition. Within weeks, the Americans were the better off as Greene remained one march ahead of his pursuer. The army in front had the benefit of foraging the countryside it moved through while leaving crumbs for their pursuer. River after river was crossed as British rations dwindled. Mile after mile, the redcoats were led deep into the Carolina countryside, inching towards Virginia. The pursuit crossed into southern Virginia and reached its climax on February 14, 1781 when Greene faced the Dan River. As Washington had done at the Delaware River in 1776 when Cornwallis was hot on his heels, Greene commandeered all the local boats to ferry his army and cannon over the river. It was at Boyd’s Ferry where the last of Greene’s rear guard crossed, just hours before Cornwallis found himself once more standing before a wide river with no way to cross, staring at his opponent slipping from his grasp.
Cornwallis reluctantly turned away and marched his army seventy-five miles southwest to Hillsboro, North Carolina which served as his center of operations. Over the next week, from the 15th to the 22nd, Greene combed the Virginia countryside. He resupplied his army while his men received the rest and medical attention they needed. But more importantly, Greene nearly doubled his force from the arrival of fresh troops from North Carolina and Virginia riflemen. Meanwhile, Cornwallis contemplated his next move. He had to make do with what supplies his men carried, the land south of the Dan having been picked clean by Greene’s forces. And like Greene, he sent out appeals for militia and waited for the expectant forces to arrive.
British Colonel Banastre Tarleton Sent West to the Haw River
Cornwallis’ call for loyalist volunteers did not go unheeded. Colonel Dr. John Pyle gathered upwards of four hundred fellow North Carolina loyalists to join the British. They hailed from western Alamance county, eastern Guilford county, and northern Randolph and Chatham counties. Supposedly, Pyle sent word to Cornwallis requesting he detach a force to rendezvous with his militia to provide an escort. There are no primary sources that indicate Cornwallis tasked Tarleton to bring in Pyle’s militia, but to only seek out loyalist recruits throughout the western regions of North Carolina. The area was known to have a large population of Scottish loyalists. Further, that once Tarleton headed out toward the Haw River region, there is no documentation that this writer knows of which proves Tarleton was even made aware of Colonel Pyle’s desire to join with the cavalry’s legion. This leaves some accounts to speculate that Cornwallis, keen to draft more troops, kept tabs on possible militia, and having learned of Pyle’s desire to join him, sent Tarleton to both bring in Pyle and snatch up any additional loyalists in the process. On February 18, Cornwallis ordered Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his legion of cavalry and light infantry of approximately 450 men to fan out west of the Haw River.
Lt. Colonel Henry ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee Crossed the Dan into North Carolina
On the morning of February 17th, Greene ordered Lee and his Legion to cross the Dan and return to North Carolina. According to Lee’s memoirs, he did so the next day. With him were Brigadier General Andrew Pickens of South Carolina leading militia and two companies of veteran Maryland infantry under Captain Edward[1] Oldham. Of Lee’s original mission, there are two versions; whether he was to go after Tarleton’s troops, or to scout and report back Cornwallis’ movements. Nowhere do primary sources indicate Lee knew of Dr. Pyle’s militia before crossing the Dan. The fact that Lee was ordered south of the Dan River and into North Carolina the same day Tarleton headed out of Hillsborough west to the Haw River, would also indicate that Lee was not cognizant of Tarleton’s presence. Greene ordered his able subordinate to “gain the front of Cornwallis, to place themselves as close to him as safety would permit, in order to interrupt his communication with the country, to repress the mediated rising of the loyalists, and, at all events, to intercept any party of them which might attempt to join the enemy.”[2] The last part of this directive may explain why Lee decided to attack the loyalist militia under Dr. Pyle, instead of focusing on Tarleton.
Lee Learns of and Pursues Tarleton
Fifty miles separated the Dan from Hillsborough, NC and Cornwallis’ army. Lee pushed on through straggly forest and unplowed meadows and within a couple of days, set up a hidden camp along the Salisbury Road, between Hillsborough (eight miles to the east) and the Haw River crossing points, about eighteen miles further to the west. He immediately dispatched scouts to keep abreast of British and loyalist activity. Before dawn the following day, a scout he’d sent towards Hillsborough to keep an eye on British patrols, returned to report that a column of British troops under Colonel Banastre Tarleton had, on the preceding day from where they had set up camp, passed and was heading toward the Haw River with an estimated force of four hundred men, including horse, foot, and artillery. It was assumed that Tarleton would cross the Haw to assemble loyalist militia and then escort them back to Hillsborough.
Lee decided to pursue Tarleton’s corps in hopes of attacking the hated cavalrymen. He sent reconnoitering parties to their front with orders to conceal themselves in sight of the road and to report from time to time. Meanwhile, the main body of patriots moved obliquely to the far right of the road through an unsettled region so as not to be spotted. They advanced cautiously and camped the night within three miles of the Salisbury Road. The Haw was to their right around seven miles distant. That evening, the advance party returned with a local who reported that Tarleton had yet to pass the river and that he believed they would do so the next day. The following morning, February 24th, Lee set off for the road. He met one of his dragoon scouts who stated that Tarleton had indeed crossed the Haw River. With that news, Lee and Pickens thought to better their time and took directly to the road to follow their enemy’s route. Locals reported that the artillery Tarleton brought comprised of two small brass field pieces. Lee hastened his men forward and forded the Haw when he received information that Tarleton was camping approximately four miles distant.
Lee Prepares to Attack Tarleton
Soon after fording the river, a local patriot confided that Tarleton’s corps had made camp and had unsaddled their horses. As to numbers, the countryman confirmed that Tarleton had more horse than Lee, but was inferior in the number of infantry. Lee immediately formed his men for battle. He commanded his Legion’s infantry in the center and would move directly towards the enemy. The cavalry would be in column to his right under Captain Michael Rudolph, a sergeant major who received his commission after gallantry at Paulus Hook. The militia rifleman under Brigadier Pickens were on the left. Oldham, with the two Maryland companies were in reserve. For the sake of surprise, the march was concealed by keeping to the woods with local guides for each division. When they came upon the enemy, Captain Rudolph would charge in full gallop supported by the Continental troops. Lee, along with Picken’s command would capture the artillery and carry the field with fixed bayonets.
When they got within a few hundred yards of Tarleton’s camp, they were surprised to find the enemy gone. It appears Tarleton had only stopped to rest his troops. The van of the horse galloped to the house and brought off two of Tarleton’s staff who had been delayed while settling with the family for provisions. The family informed Lee that Tarleton would not advance above six miles further. The patriots once more took up the march, hoping to catch their enemy before nightfall. On this second attempt to surprise Tarleton, Lee placed himself and his horse in front of the quick moving column, followed by his Legion of infantry, with the militia and Maryland troops bringing up the rear.
Similarity of Uniforms Leads to a Plan Against Tarleton
By 1781, Lee’s Legion wore a uniform nearly identical to British Colonel Tarleton’s Legion. On February 24th, as Lee’s Legion rushed forward in a second attempt to catch Tarleton, local residents who witnessed them pass were at first fooled by the patriots’ appearance. Atop their heads were domed shaped headgear common among mounted dragoons. Below were short, green woolen jackets with white linen or doeskin (buff) trousers; the exact uniform as Tarleton’s men. Only when the militiamen and Maryland infantry made their appearance, did it become obvious to local observers that these troops were not British. It is upon this similarity that Lee came upon a ruse to surprise his enemy. Lee wrote, “To give success, if possible, to this second attempt, [at attacking Lee] it was determined to pass as a reinforcement sent from Hillsborough to Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton.”[3] The two British officers he caught at the farm earlier that day were placed under guard in the center of Lee’s advance party to help with the ploy. Lee followed close behind with his horse supported by the rest of his troops. Though Lee does not give specifics, one can surmise that he hoped to fool British pickets and allow his men to get in close amidst the enemy as he wrote, “to give success…” Interestingly, this ruse to pass off his troops in a possible attack against Tarleton was planned prior to Lee having received knowledge of Colonel Pyle’s Loyalist militia.
Lee Discovers Pyle’s Militia
Lee’s memoir states, “a van officer proceeding him [Lee] a few hundred yards only, was met by two well mounted young countrymen, who being accosted in the assumed character [Lee’s officer wearing similar dress to the British], promptly answered, that they were rejoiced in meeting us, having been sent forward by Colonel Pyle for the purpose of ascertaining Tarleton’s camp, to whom the colonel was repairing with four hundred loyalists.”[4] This indicates Pyle was aware of Tarleton’s presence and was keen to join up with him. The dragoon brought the two young men to Lee who wrote “finding them completely deceived…believed the troops they saw to be British…took them to be Tarleton’s, addressing the commandant as that officer.”[5] Under questioning, they eagerly informed Lee as to the size and purpose of the loyalist militia including their location. According to Lee, he instantly seized upon a plan. He kept one of the young militiamen by his side while he sent the other with his van officer to report to Pyle. He instructed the youth to “proceed to colonel Pyle with Lt. Colonel Tarleton’s gratulations, and his request that he would be so good as to draw out on the margin of the road, so as to give convenient room for his much fatigued troops to pass without delay to their night position
Was the Attack Planned or by Chance and Who Struck First?
Questions continue to linger as to how several events unfolded. Why did Lee, who was in hot pursuit of Tarleton, change course when he became aware of loyalist militia nearby? Was he following Greene’s directive to a tea which ordered him to disarm and disband any loyalist organizations he happened upon? Was it chance or a clever plan that drew the patriot and loyalist forces together, resulting in what the British at the time termed Pyle’s Massacre? Lee’s original report to Greene stated he came across the loyalists by chance and was forced to attack when they fired upon his militia. Other accounts claim the two sides fired upon each other as soon as they made contact. In Lee’s published memoir, he gave more detail, writing that he came upon Pyle’s men by recent intelligence, but the encounter between the two forces was a planned ruse. Did Lee trick the loyalist militia to get among them, as Lee clearly stated, detailing the similarity of Tarleton’s and his Legion’s uniforms which allowed his veteran troops to draw near to apprehend the loyalists? As such, did he actually ride amongst the loyalists unmolested, greeting their commander while complementing the militia, fooling them into believing that his troops were a British Legion commanded by none other than the infamous Banastre Tarleton?
And how did the violence begin? Accounts confirm that Lee did not plan to attack the militia, but to capture and disarm them. However, events got out of control quickly in which either the militia or the patriots struck first, resulting in the militia’s total destruction. Again, there are variations. Some state the loyalists spotted the patriot militia moving among the trees and fired upon them, as does Lee himself. There are also accounts that witness the attack was initiated by loyalist comments that resulted in patriots striking them, which erupted in the assault. The end result was a close order attack by experienced, veteran troops against a surprised group of farmers and merchants playing soldier. The outcome, as would be expected, was a quarter of Pyle’s men lay dead, most from saber slashes, with many more wounded. And of Lee’s men, only one horse succumbed to what has also been termed, the Battle of Haw River.
Lee’s Memoir Details the Attack
Lee divided his forces between Capt. Joseph Eggleston and Capt. Joseph Graham while he personally commanded a third. The militia, under Brigadier Andrew Pickens would approach through the woods and the Maryland troops would be held in reserve. When Lee caught sight of Pyle’s mounted militia, they were lined up as he had requested; drawn up along the right side of the road with eyes forward in review formation, they sat stiffly in their saddles with muskets slung over shoulders or in harnesses.
Colonel Pyle was on the far right of his men, meaning that Lee would have to ride the full length of the loyalists’ horses before he came to Pyle. As such, Lee’s troopers positioned themselves before each of Pyle’s men, “…and thus to place his column [Lee’s] of horse in the most eligible situation for any vicissitude.”[6] Lee stated he did not want to attack the loyalists, but to disperse them. His intent was clear in his memoir, “Lee had concluded to make known to the colonel his real character as soon as he should confront him, with a solemn assurance of his and his associates’ perfect exemption from injury, and with the choice of returning to their homes, or of taking a more generous part, by uniting with the defender of their common country against the common foe.”[7]
Accordingly, as Lee rode past the loyalists who thought he was Lt. Colonel Tarleton, he offered a “smiling countenance, dropping occasional expressions complimentary to the good looks and commendable conduct of his loyal friends.”[8] Once Lee reached Pyle, they exchanged pleasantries, the later believing he was addressing Tarleton. “Grasping Pyle by the hand, Lee was in the act of consummating his plan [capturing the loyalists]…” But the moment Lee took Pyle’s hand, all hell broke loose. The loyalist left noticed some of Picken’s militia advancing through the woods and fired upon the rear of the cavalry that was commanded by Captain Eggleston. This does concur somewhat with Eggleston’s later account. Eggleston instantly turned upon the foe directly in front of him, as did the entire column of Lee’s men. Both surprised and in a compromised position, the militia was, as the term amply serves, ‘sitting ducks’. “Their guns were on their shoulders, the muzzles consequently in an opposite direction to the cavalry…they must have changed the direction before they could fire, a motion not to be performed, with a body of dragoons close in with their horses’ heads and their swords drawn.”[9]
Ten minutes later and one fourth of Pyle’s men were killed outright, a greater number suffered horrendous wounds, and the rest were scattered. There were no casualties to Lee’s force except the loss of one horse. This lends credence to Lee’s account that his men had drawn in close to their enemy and as such, surprised them with a sudden and vicious, one-sided attack. Even after the attack began, accounts indicate that the loyalists were still confused. Believing that Tarleton’s men were mistaken, they cried out “God save the King,” and “You are killing your own men.” Some loyalists were able to draw their muskets and fowling pieces, but the fire was erratic; most never bothered as their weapons were not loaded. The attack was fierce as reported by patriot Captain Joseph Graham, “swords broke, others bent…”[10]
Lee’s account continued, “The conflict was quickly decided, and bloody on one side only. Ninety of the royalists were killed and most of the survivors wounded. Dispersing in every direction, not being pursued, they escaped. During this sudden recontre [sp.], in some parts of the line the cries of mercy was heard, coupled with assurance of being our best friends…Pyle, falling under many wounds, was left on the field as dying, and yet he survived. We lost not a man, and only one horse.”[11]
Lee Resumes Pursuit of Tarleton
Lee recorded that Tarleton was camped a mile or so away and must have heard the musket fire. He gathered his men and set off towards the British. He approached cautiously in case Tarleton was intent on investigating and possibly planning to attack. The patriot cavalry, with militia and Marylanders following, soon came within sight of Tarleton’s camp. It was sunset when Lee decided to postpone an assault on Tarleton’s forces until the morning. Soon after, three hundred “hardy mountaineering” militia patriots from Virginia arrived at Lee’s camp. Having learned of Greene’s presence in Virginia, they assembled under Colonel Preston of Montgomery County, Virginia and were heading east when they discovered Lee’s force.
At two in the morning of February 25th, Lee divided his force and moved forward to attack Tarleton’s camp. Lee commanded his Legion’s infantry along the road. Oldham and the Marylanders advanced parallel to Lee on the right. Further on their right and through woods skirting the fields was Brigadier Pickens and his militia. Newly arrived Colonel Preston and his Virginia riflemen covered Lee’s left, also taking advantage of woods that skirted the fields. The cavalry under Captain Rudolph was in reserve in the rear. As Lee advanced, patrols reported that the enemy was in motion and by three am, they were retiring. Lee ordered skirmishers forward and the main body to follow close behind. Officers questioned some of the local residents with whom Tarleton’s troops had bedded down. They reported to Lee that General Cornwallis had been informed of Lee’s and Picken’s presence and ordered Tarleton to immediately return to Hillsborough.
In the predawn hours, Lee’s pickets were able to follow the distant pine pitch torches of Tarleton’s column. It became apparent that he was passing by the two ferry routes and was headed seven miles further to the ford. Lee’s cavalry and mounted riflemen caught up to Tarleton’s rear guard, but were not numerous enough to delay Tarleton’s forces from fording the river. Lee’s men had been pushed hard for the past twenty-four hours without much food or rest. By dawn, with the possibility of Cornwallis having sent reinforcements to assure Tarleton’s safe return, Lee decided to call off the pursuit and rest his men. Greene had already crossed the Dan with his main force on the 23rd and would soon be joining Lee’s detachment. Loyalists reported Greene’s advance into North Carolina to Cornwallis who would soon advance his army. The two forces would clash two weeks later at Guilford Courthouse.
Other Primary Source Accounts
Most historians agree that Lee did not intend to attack Pyle’s force, but to disband the militia and encourage them to go home. As to the action being planned or by chance, historians are not so sure, split between Lee’s later memoirs and the reports of other primary sources. Here are a few of those other accounts.
- Brigadier Pickens reported to Greene that Pyle’s men mistook the Americans for Tarleton’s troops. He also wrote that “Out men were in some measure under the same mistake, but soon found out…” He claimed that the Americans then attacked the loyalists.
- Capt. Joseph Graham was riding alongside Capt. Eggleston of Lee’s Legion and behind the Legion cavalry. He commanded seventy North Carolina mounted militiamen armed with swords. He recorded that at first, he believed the loyalists to be part of Capt. [Major] Joseph Dixon’s patriot militia who had been on his right earlier. But when he discovered their clothes were cleaner and a strip of red cloth in their hats, he realized his mistake and turned to Eggleston saying, “That is a company of Tories…” Eggleston then turned to one of Pyle’s officers close by and asked, “to whom do you belong?” The loyalist replied that he was “a friend of His Majesty.” Graham wrote that Eggleston immediately struck the officer over the head and on example, the militia “rushed on the Tories like lightning and cut away.”
- Graham gave a different version on his pension application stating that it was not Eggleston who had begun the assault, but the militia. When the North Carolina militia drew near enough to recognize the red strip of cloth in the loyalists’ hats, they immediately attacked.
- Thomas Boyd of the North Carolina militia confirmed Lee’s planned ruse, stating later that after Pyle “mustered his men on the side of the road in order to receive the supposed Colonel Tarleton,” Lee and his captains, “moved up with their mounted men (leaving the infantry some little distance behind in order for battle).” When Lee reached “the upper end of Colonel Pyle’s line,” Lee’s mounted Legion spun about “facing to Pyle’s line, amidst shouts of long live King George from both parties, our troops drawing their swords attacked the Tories and cut them down.”[12]
- Moses Hall was with the North Carolina mounted militia under Captain Hugh Hall and Major Joseph Dixon’s command. His pension statement supports Lee’s account that the encounter was a planned ruse writing, “…mistaking our Troops for Tarleton’s Colonel Lee and Officers kept up the deception and Colonel Lee and his Light Horse marching in one column or line, and Major or Colonel Dixon’s command in another, some interval apart, the Tories passed into this interval, between our lines… They frequently uttered salutations of a friendly kind believing us to be British. Colonel Lee knew what he was about & so did the Major Dixon.”[13] He also indicated the rank and file were not in on the ruse writing, “But my Captain Hall, perceiving they were Tories and thinking that Colonel Lee did not know it…he called Colonel Lee… Colonel Lee, they are every blood of them Tories… [Lee gave a sign to proceed with the initial command] In a few minutes or less time, [when] the Tories were completely covered by our lines upon both flanks or front and rear…the bugle sounded to attack and the slaughter began…Tories crying out ‘your own men…as good subjects of his Majesty has in America.’
- Samuel Eakin of North Carolina militia under the command of Colonel William Moore and Brigadier Pickens, recorded in his pension statement that Lee’s force was in a rapid march in pursuit of Pile’s militia and “came up with them about ten miles from Butler’s Mills where a total rout and slaughter of the Enemy took place…” and that the loyalists “were killed on orders being to give them Buford’s play.” Buford’s play or Tarleton’s Quarter were used by patriot troops after the May 29th massacre of American troops during the Battle of Waxhaws; meaning to take no prisoners and kill all enemy troops. Easkin also indicates prisoners were taken – “the residue being mostly wounded were taken Prisoners by us.”[14]
- Captain William Lenoir in the North Carolina Regiment, Wilkes County Regiment, claimed that the encounter with Pile’s militia was by chance writing that they “fell in with a body of Tories of whom they immediately engaged.”
- Samuel Findley, regional guide to Colonel Lee supports the position that they came upon Pyle’s militia by chance stating that they “surprised” Pyle’s men “in a lane.”[15]
- Philip Higdon, was the only known account from a member of Pyle’s militia. He was taken prisoner after the attack and reported that while marching, “they were overtaken by Colonel Lee and a battle immediately commenced.” No mention of drawing up in review before a mistaken British legion.
Prisoners Later Hacked to Death
Lt Lawrence Manning of Lee’s Legion reported that several prisoners, many wounded, were taken prisoners. Moses HallNorth Carolina militia also reported in his pension statement that some loyalists were held as prisoners. He added that the evening after the battle, six were suddenly and horrifically butchered with swords. He wrote, “The evening after our Battle with the Tories, we having a considerable number of prisoners…We went to where six were standing together. Some discussion taking place, I heard some of our men cry out “remember Buford” [reference to Tarleton’s slaughter of Americans trying to surrender at the Battle of Waxhaws, May 29, 1780] and the prisoners were immediately hewed to pieces with broad swords…”[16]
Aftermath
Major General Nathanael Greene greeted the annihilation of Pyle’s militia by stating, “It has had a happy effect on those disaffected persons [loyalists], of which there are too many in this country.” It was obvious that Greene had no desire to expect Lee to be merciful towards their enemies, whether they be redcoats or loyalist Americans. However, the news caused great shock in the British camp, which was quick to refer it a massacre. Exaggerated stores ran rampant as the grisly event was told and retold. One officer of the 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers wrote to his brother that ‘three hundred of our friends….were every man scalped, and their leader, Colonel Pyle, hung up by his heels.” Lord Cornwallis wrote to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, that Pyle’s force was “inhumanly butchered, when begging for quarters, without making the least resistance.”
Lee later noted that if he had wanted a massacre, he would have chased down the remnants of Pyle’s company. Lt. Lawrence Manning of Lee’s Legion remarked that many of the Tories had been allowed to escape, precisely to spread terror among the King’s friends. However, it is doubtful that this was discussed prior to the attack for Lee did not intend violence, but only to disband the militia. And once the ten minute battle was over, Lee was more interested in assembling his troops for the upcoming battle with Lee’s forces, camped only a couple miles away. He did not want his men scattered over the countryside hunting down escaped militia.
Though not planned, the vicious attack dampened the zeal for those loyal to the crown. The survivors told of the vicious, sword-wielding brutality by ferocious patriot horsemen and militia who cut down loyalists without mercy. Also squashed were the fantastic tales of the British Army’s superior cavalry to American forces. Loyal Scottish Highlanders and Irish immigrants who made up a large percentage of North Carolina’s population decided under such circumstances, to remain home and allow the fate of the British empire in America lay with Lord Cornwallis’ troops. By the time Cornwallis faced Greene at Guilford Courthouse on March 15th, he was outnumbered two to one by a patriot force that had nearly doubled in size from patriot militia over the past few weeks. Meanwhile Cornwallis’ numbers had remained stagnant; the droves of loyalist militias he had expected never materializing. After ‘Pyle’s Massacre’, only a handful of loyalists came armed to the British camp. And as they say, the rest is history.
For Colonel (Dr.) John Pyle, local legend has the badly wounded Pyle crawling into a nearby pond where he concealed himself until found by loyalists. He recovered from his wounds, but surrendered to local patriot militia. He was pardoned after the Battle of Guilford Courthouse after the doctor had cared for wounded patriots.
Mass Burial Sites Found
Patriots buried the victims beside the road. As late as the 1850’s, local residents were able to point out the location of the battle and the mass graves of those killed; covered with periwinkle, a plant used to mark grave sites during the American Revolution. A stone marker had been placed among the grave sites in 1880, which had since been removed. The graves had been ignored and lost for decades until recently. Carole Troxler, professor of history at Elon College, and others pinpointed the location of the mass graves using 18th century maps, topographical charts, and historical accounts left by primary sources present during the Haw River Battle. Their work was reported by Jim Schlosser on September 25, 2000 and revised in 2015 in the News and Record, Greensboro, North Carolina. Troxler stated in the article that the site is near Anthony Road, between the village of Alamance and N.C. Rt 49 South, not from the Great Alamance Creek, and is still covered by the original periwinkle, with the addition of several cedar trees. The grave site for the prisoners murdered the evening after the battle, as reported by Moses Hall, was found about a half mile from the battle scene. At the time, Troxler stated that the aim was to guarantee the burial and battle sites were preserved. Long range, she hoped to see a small park of both; connected by a narrow trail. A stone memorial presently sits on the battle site as does the state of North Carolina recognized Pyle’s Defeat with a historical marker on highway N.C. 49. Also, Alamance historians have erected a marker on Anthony Road.
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RESOURCE
Allison, Robert J. The American Revolution a Concise History. 2011: Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
“The Battle of Haw River” The American Revolution in North Carolina.
Dixon, Joseph. The American Revolution in North Carolina.
Eakin, Samuel. Southern Campaigns American Revolution Pension Statements & Rosters
Hall, Moses. Southern Campaigns American Revolution Pension Statements & Rosters
Heitman, Francis B. Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army During the War of the Revolution. 1914: The Rare Book Shop Publishing Company, Inc., New York, NY.
Lee, Henry, ‘Light Horse Harry’. Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States. 1827: Printed by Peter Force, Washington, DC.
Lenoir, Captain William. The American Revolution in North Carolina
Manning, Lt. Lawrence. Southern Campaigns American Revolution Pension Statements & Rosters
Piecuch, Jim. “Light Horse Harry Lee and Pyle’s Massacre.” Journal of the American Revolution
“Pyle’s Defeat”. The American Revolution in North Carolina.
“Pyle Memorial.” Commemorative Landscapes. Pyle Memorial. https://docsouth.unc.edu/commland/monument/38/
Royster, Charles. Light Horse Harry Lee and the Legacy of the American Revolution. 1981: Alfred A. Knoph, New York, NY.
Schlosser, Jim. “Revolutionary Burial Site Spared\The Winner This Time in Alamance County was Not the Tories or the Patriots, But the Preservationists.” New and Record, September 26, 2000.
Sherman, William Thomas. Lee’s Legion Remembered. Profiles of the 2d Partisan Corps as taken from Alexander Garden’s Anecdotes (1822 & 1828 eds.)
Weigley, Russel Frank. The Partisan War: the South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782 South Carolina 1770 Tricentenial Commission, Charleston, SC
FOOTNOTES
[1] Captain Edward Oldham was captain of the 5th Maryland Continentals. There is no record of an Andrew Oldham as reported in many internet articles. John Oldham was present in Greene’s army, having fought at and survived Camden. But he was with the North Carolina militia. He would not have been given a command of Continental soldiers.
[2] Lee Memoir of War, pg. 152
[3] Ibid., pg. 154.
[4] Ibid., pg. 155.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., pg. 156
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10]Piecuch
[11] Lee, pg. 156
[12] Piecuch
[13] Hall, Pension Statement
[14] Easkin, Pension Statement
[15] Piecuch
[16] Ibid.