When the British charged that hot day on August 16, 1780, the militia, two-thirds of the American army, threw aside their weapons and broke ranks, most never even firing a shot. But not all Americans turned and ran for their lives. The Continental soldiers left on the battlefield, now grossly outnumbered, stood firm. They did their duty. And in the face of incredible odds, they held the mass of British steel at bay. Not only did they hold the line, but they attacked, continually, until only a few were left standing, only to be cut down by British mounted dragoons. For the proud Delaware and Maryland regiments who honored their nation that day, to a man they died, were wounded, or were captured. Only a tiny remnant escaped. That is the legacy of Camden. Not the cowardice of men faced with the ultimate choice, including the commanding American general, but those who understood what it took to fully honor a cause, to gasp it firmly, and be prepared to stand by it, no matter what. The Battle of Camden has gone down in history as a devastating defeat for the American Army, but not so for the Continental soldiers who gave their all that day. Their actions, their determination, and their willingness to die for what they believed carried on in the spirit of a people destined to achieve victory in their struggle for self government.

Washington Sends His Best Troops South

Earlier, in April of 1780, Washington had learned that General Clinton, who had since March of that year had bottled up General Lincoln’s army at Charleston, had called for Lord Rawdon and an additional 2,500 south to join him. Washington, who some weeks earlier had sent the Virginia line to Charleston’s defense, now decided to send his best troops south to counter Clinton’s newest move. He put the Maryland line and the Delaware Regiment, along with the 1^st Artillery of 18 field pieces under marching orders; 1,400 Continental soldiers of all ranks were commanded by the stalwart and highly professional German commander Major General the Baron De Kalb.

General De Kalb’s march south begun on April 16^th, and was immediately hindered by a shortage of provisions, including a critical deficiency of food. His men, for the most part of their grueling journey south lived constantly on the verge of starvation. Even at the start of their journey Washington wrote on April 13^th, “How they will get on for want of provisions, transportation &ca., heaven alone can tell, I cannot.” Throughout the march, nothing had been relied upon for provisions, nothing was prepared in advance. As far as foraging, much of the country traveled was through distinct Tory districts in which the granaries and livestock were nonexistent; little if anything became available for the trudging patriot army. By June 22^nd, 1780, they arrived at Hillsboro, North Carolina. By then word must have reached them of General Lincoln’s surrender at Charleston on May 12^th with included nearly the entire southern army of over five thousand troops. With little if anything in their stomachs, often fasting for several days, they continued south, carrying all their baggage and armaments on their backs. By the time they got to Buffalo Ford on Deep River, they could go no further and waited for two weeks for the now promised reinforcement of North Carolina militia.

General De Kalb Sought Reinforcements

At Buffalo Ford De Kalb found Colonel Charles Armand’s force, 120 horse and foot soldiers, Count Pulaski’s men, their former leader having died at Savannah. Major General Richard Caswell was nearby along with his North Carolina militia. DeKalb called upon Caswell to join him, hoping the state would take care of its own and the militia would bring in enough food and supplies for both armies. Also Brigadier General Edward Steens, with some Virginia militiamen and a corps of about a hundred other Virginians under Lt. Colonel Charles Porterfield were in the area. Caswell and Steens did not accept deKalb’s offer to join him, offering excuses to remain aloof. After General Lincoln’s, capture De Kalb, as Major General on the field, was technically in command of the southern army, however Congress was reluctant to have a foreigner hold such an important position.

The Darling of Congress, Major General Horatio Takes Command

Congress’ pick of Gates to lead the southern army, over Washington’s choice of Nathanael Greene, was the hero of Saratoga and one who had many influential friends in Congress. DeKalb heard of Gates appointment over himself and being a true military man, wrote on July 16^th that he was happy to hear of Gate’s coming. Gates arrived on July 25^th. Overconfident and blind to reality, Gates titled his command as the ‘Grand Army’ and began planning immediate action to take on his enemy. In reality, Gates had an army without strength, a military chest without money, the area in which they encamped was void of possible forage, the local patriots depressed, and the Tories elated by a strong British presence in the region. Instead of seeking a solution to the army’s deficiencies while taking the time needed to bring his command up to strength, Gates was assertive. Without planning a forthright offensive, he decided to confront his enemy, on the most direct approach to Camden where a substantial British force was posted. He would be decisive and waste no time in attacking it. In his mind victory was at hand.

The Desolate route to Camden

Gate’s proposed a direct route to Camden which would be fifty miles shorter than an alternate path, but it ran through thinly peopled and infertile pine barrens. It was a wilderness of deep sands, swamps, and multiple rivers that could become flooded in a matter of hours. The enemy had previously foraged what foods and supplies could be had and more so, it crossed Cross Creek County, a region of staunch loyalists, among the most unfriendly to patriots. De Kalb suggested a more circuitous route. The army was exhausted and malnourished by the lack of provisions and long periods of scant rations and fasting. The path he advised would take the army through Rowan and Mecklenburg counties in which Salisbury and Charlotte lay, a land rich with supplies and food, inhabited by Scotch-Irish, patriots able and willing to supply hungry soldiers sent to drive the raiding Tories from their counties. An army rested and well nourished could stand well in a desperate fight against British regulars. And if a retreat from Camden was necessary, the road would lead back to Charlotte and friendly country.

Officers who knew the region and the condition of the army were mortified when Gates ordered to take the direct road. They all agreed. They commanded an army that had spent weeks traveling hundreds of miles on little or no food, did not even have half-rations, and was now expected to take the hard and hungry road while a well fed and well rested enemy waited to do battle. By all accounts it was simply foolhardy and cruel. The officers drafted a letter, signed by all, pointing out the advantages of the longer route proposed by DeKalb, including the opportunity to pick up additional militiamen. Gates promised to call a council of officers to discuss the matter, but never did. The army marched on July 27^th towards a barren and inhospitable land with little or no food and no promise of obtaining any along the road.

Grueling and Exasperating March to Battle

Day after day the situation grew worse. Food ran out. There was none in the wagons nor could any be found in the countryside. Men lived on occasional green corn plucked from a few fields and peaches with the usual affects of diarrhea and dysentery. Farmers fled before the army carting all their food and livestock. The occasion stray cattle, miserable lean creatures, were quickly devoured offering little sustenance. Gates heard the grumbling and to avoid the possibility of a mutiny, lied that provisions were on the way and would catch up with the army in a few days. That never happened. At the Pee Dee River Gates met the remains of General Lincoln’s cavalry with Colonels Anthony White and William Washington; they had been recruiting additional men to their corps of horse. They asked Gates to assist in filling their ranks and they would join him. Gates refused their offer which deprived his army of additional cavalry, what would have been an asset of great value. On August 3^rd, he did pick up Lt. Colonel Charles Porterfield who led a hundred Virginia state troops. Porterfield had gained recognition as a dependable officer who, as a captain had gained laurels at the Battle of Brandywine. Half staved, sick and exhausted, Gates army pushed onward, eighteen miles a day.

General Caswell’s North Carolina Militia Joins Gates

On August 5^th, Gates received notice from General Caswell that he was going to attack an enemy post. Gates feared that Caswell’s force of North Carolina militiamen would do poorly and he would lose their support. He rode to Caswell’s camp at Lynch’s Creek and learned that Caswell was not about to attack the enemy. Instead the militia commander wanted Gates help, having just learned that he was about to be attacked. However this proved unfounded. British Colonel Rawdon had initiated a feint on Caswell’s front, then pulled back to Little Lynch’s Creek, within a mile of Camden. Gates brought the rest of his army up and was grateful to add Caswell’s 2,100 man militia to his ranks. What Gates thought was a blessing would soon prove to be an albatross that doomed his entire command.

Gates was in a quandary. He could not remain where he was, not without food. He could not move his army to his left as it would position Camden in his rear and cut off any aid from the north. To the right was favorable land with the settlements of Waxhaws. However, if he took his army in that direction, it would seem that he was retreating and might lose his North Carolina militia. He therefore, without any plan in place, stumbled blindly forward.

Sumter Draws off Troops from Gates’ Army

On August 14^th, Gates halted his forces at Rugeley’s Mill where he was joined by General Edward Stevens and 700 Virginia militia. Here he waited for two days. While encamped and trying to decide his next move, Sumter contacted him and requested troops to attack a British wagon train carrying clothing, ammunition, and other provisions. Gates, knowing his enemy was close at hand and he would most likely need every man and musket available, for reasons entirely his own, agreed. He detached a company of artillery, 300 North Carolina militia and most critical, 100 Maryland Continentals, among the best troops under his command. This reduced Gates artillery to only six cannon.

Cornwallis Joins Rawdon

During all this maneuvering and hesitation by the Americans, Cornwallis received a rumor that the American force was far larger than it was and hastened from Charleston to join Rawdon. The British now had a total force of 2,239 men in which 1,400 were professional rank and file soldiers. They also had Tarleton’s British Legion of 289 dragoons which would prove devastating to those rebels trying to make their escape. On the American side, Gates had a total of 4,100 rank and file. Though Gates outnumbered the British, only 900 of his men were disciplined regular Continental troops, those from Maryland and Delaware under De Kalb.

Armies Clash Unexpectedly

With Cornwallis and Rawdon’s forces drawn up in Camden, Gates decided to march his army to Sanders Creek, about seven miles from Camden. The order to march was set for 10 PM as it would be an all night affair. The officers were credulous. Colonel Otho Williams later wrote, “how it could be conceived that an army consisting of more than two-thirds militia and which had never been once exercised in arms together, could form columns and perform other maneuvers in the night and in the face of an enemy.” Therefore tired, sick and worn out soldiers set off on a long and dreary all night march, with the expectation by morning to be embroiled in a desperate battle. For more than four weary hours men stumbled in the dark and trudged through deep sand and frequent swamps. It sapped every ounce of their remaining strength. Suddently, the grueling march erupted in the crash of musketry. It seemed that by extraordinary coincidence, Cornwallis had intended to surprise Gates in a night march at the same hour Gates had set off. The two forces met head on. It was Tarleton’s advance corps that opened fire which was returned by the astonished American vanguard. Tarleton charged and the rebel infantry pulled back upon the 1^st Continental Brigade, throwing them into confusion. However Porterfield and Armstrong, veteran officers, stood their ground and their men erupted in a heavy fire halting Tarleton’s assault. The British infantry deployed in line across the road as did the Americans but then just as suddenly, the firing stopped; neither side wished to fight a battle in the dead of night.

Gates was astonished to learn that both Cornwallis and Rawdon’s forces were a mere 600 yards to his front. He called a council of war. DeKalb wanted to withdraw as did many of the officers, but Gates had made up his mind. They would remain where they were and fight. Gates gave the order, “To your commands, gentlemen.” It would prove to be one of the few he would give prior to and during the entire action. It was soon learned that the Americans would go into battle without one of their best officers; Colonel Porterfield had been mortally wounded in the brief night skirmish.

The Battlefield

The two armies had met in a sparse pine forest. The open woods were flanked on both sides by extensive swamps. The ground was somewhat wider at the American end. The rebels had the advantage of the higher ground with a direct avenue for retreat. The wider landscape proved to be a disadvantage as if they were pushed back, they would lose contact with the swamps and were in jeopardy of being flanked. The British position was not any better. They would have to fight up a slight grade. Also their end was slightly narrower and if needed to retreat, there was a two hundred wide creek to their rear that could entrap their entire army.

The Americans formed their battle lines prior to sunrise. Typically, an army’s strength and most experienced troops held the coveted position on the right. General Mordecai Gist of the 2^nd, commanding one Delaware and three Maryland regiments, was on the right; Colonel Caswell’s North Carolina militia was in the center; and Colonel Steven’s Virginians were on the left with Colonel Charles Armand’s corps on his left flank. Brigadier General William Smallwood’s first Maryland regiment was held in reserve. Cannon were placed in front of the Delaware position with a pair held in reserve before Smallwood’s men. DeKalb was in command of the right wing and took his place in line. Gates and his staff, as at Saratoga where he remained on Bemis Heights, far from the scene of action, positioned himself a comfortable six hundred yards behind the American line.

The British left lined up opposite Gist’s Continentals. It was composed of the Volunteers of Ireland, Tarleton’s infantry, the Royal North Carolina Regiment, and Colonel Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Tory volunteers. They were under Lord Rawdon’s direct command. The British right was made up of the 33^rd Regiment (Cornwallis’ own) three companies of the 23^rd, and a company of light infantry commanded by Lt. Colonel James Webster. There was a second line of the 71^st Highlanders, with two 6 pound cannon. Tarleton’s British Legion’s horse was held in column behind the second line. Two additional six pounders along with two three pounders held the center. Therefore the best British troops, hardened regulars and mostly veterans were lined up across from the weakest Americans, untested militia. Both armies’ flanks were lined up with the swamps on both sides. The road that branched off behind the American line led to Rugeley’s Mill and the road behind the British led back to Camden.

Opening Salvo

At dawn, artilleryman Captain Anthony Singleton opened up on the advancing British columns as they deployed. Colonel Williams rode to Gates to report the advancing British and recommended Steven’s Virginians on their left to attack before the British could form. Gates answered, “Sir, that’s right. Let it be done.” It was the first and last order he was to give that day or as historian Christopher Ward wrote, “or in any other to the end of the war.” Williams rode back to Stevens and gave the order to advance. The Virginians hesitated before a ragged and cautious advance, however the British were already formed. As Steven’s corps slowly advanced, Williams gathered about fifty volunteers and rushed them to within forty yards of the British and ordered them to open fire. But the British were already upon them and Williams fell back to the Virginians. Cornwallis was present and saw that Steven’s men were faltering in their advance. He ordered Webster to take advantage of the rebel’s timidity and charge the Virginians; the British right came on as one in close ranks. They fired one volley and charged with the deadly feared bayonet.

Militia Panicked

The Virginians were green troops and the horror of glistening steel thrust forward by screaming crazed men was too much. A few managed to get off a harmless shot before they all fell back. Stevens tried to rally them shouting “we have bayonets too!” but to no avail. As one, they threw away their weapons, turned, and ran for their lives. The North Carolina militiamen in the center saw the Virginians turn tail and were gripped with panic. Without firing a single shot, the entire line of militia, nearly 2,000 men, tossed aside their muskets and in a hysterical mob, fled for the rear and swamps. Raving mad men tore by Smallwood’s regulars held in reserve and like a torrent, raced as fast as they could for safety. Hot in pursuit were Tarleton’s Legion of mounted dragoons, picking off men from behind with their sabers and small arms fire. Only one regiment of militia, Lt. Colonel Henry Dixon’s North Carolina, positioned next to the steady ranks of Delaware and Maryland Continentals, by example, held their ground.

De Kalb’s Continentals Were Alone on the Field

The center and the left were gone. In the early morning mist and the ‘fog of war,’ clouds of thick heavy smoke from spent cannon and musket, General Gist and De Kalb were unaware that they were in serious trouble of being flanked on their left. All alone they now held the field against an overwhelming crush of British steel. Again and again Rawdon attacked to be driven back. De Kalb called for the reserve of Marylanders. It had reformed after the daunting surge of hysterical militiamen crashed through their line. General Smallwood could not be found, having suddenly left the field. Colonel Otho Williams took charge and brought the brigade forward and was immediately under fire. Williams tried to line up with De Kalb’s line, but the British had moved on the Continental’s left wing and maintained a gap of about six hundred feet between the two American forces.

Cornwallis, a keen observer and impeccable leader, saw his chance. He ordered Webster’s men to attack the front and left of Williams’ Marylanders. The rebels gave ground and were driven back, reformed, only to be driven back again before they were thoroughly routed. This left only the American right under General Gist and De Kalb maintaining the field and their original position. They doggedly beat off attack after attack. In the heat of battle, the two commanding generals thought that they were besting the British. They were unaware that the American left, including all the reserves, had vanished. Over a thousand British troops pressed forward, but the greatly outnumbered Continentals not only held them at bay, but pushed them back; one bayonet charge had broken through and claimed fifty British prisoners. But the swarm of British troops on their left flank was beginning to have its affect. Their left was turned and De Kalb was forced back, reforming again after a short distance. The Americans charged and were driven back. They rallied and incredibly, once more charged the British line.

Continentals Continue the Desperate Fight

The thick smoke, dust, men yelling, constant roll of musketry and cannon, all of it hung heavy over the battlefield. No one could see farther than the man next to him. In all the confusion, De Kalb and Gist still believed that they were winning the fight, thinking that the entire American force was holding their own against the best the British had. So they did their duty and fought on, each man in a desperate fight against death that began to claim more and more of their companions. “Never did troops show greater courage than those men of Maryland and Delaware,” wrote early historian George Bancroft. With the same mettle and obstinate determination, these Continental regiments had shown at Gowanus Heights (Battle of Long Island) and Chatterton Hill (Battle of White Plains), they continued the fight for yet another hour against a superior force determined in their complete destruction. De Kalb was unhorsed and he fought on foot. His giant frame could be seen rushing among his men, urging them on, crossing blow for blow with the enemy in close quarters as they swarmed over his dwindling command. His head had been laid open by a saber stroke. His aide pleaded with the general to withdraw, but he had no orders from Gates and still believed that the Americans were winning.

Cornwallis Throws His Entire Army at the Remaining Continentals & De Kalb Falls

The battle had now become a desperate hand-to-hand fight in horrific fierceness. Bodies were run through with sword and bayonet, steel barrels and heavy musket stocks split open skulls, men were clubbed to death and repeatedly speared by savage seventeen inch blades. Cornwallis had by now thrown his entire force on the remaining Continentals. They were entirely surrounded yet De Kalb refused to give up. He called for the bayonet. To a man the Continentals replied and charged, De Kalb at their head. They crashed through the British center, turned about and struck them from the rear. By now, De Kalb had several gunshot wounds. The blood saturated his uniform. He struck down one last soldier as the man’s bayonet pierced his chest. Wounded eleven times and weak from loss of blood, the heroic leader staggered, then fell. The Continental ranks had been cut down time and time again. Few were left, yet still they rallied and drove off yet another charge of British infantry…but there was to be no more. At that moment, Tarleton’s cavalry returned from their pursuit of the North Carolina militia and swept down on the Continentals, slashing the remaining men who finally broke.

Few Escape

Major Archibald Anderson rallied a few men from different companies. Marylanders Colonel John Gunby, Lt. Colonel John Howard, Captain Henry Dobson, along with Captain Robert Kirkwood of Delaware collected about 60 men and formed an organized retreat. The rest who had not fallen, had been seriously wounded, or were captured, man for man, scattered and tore off into the swamps. De Kalb had fallen, yet was still alive. Even while lying on the ground, he was speared by bayonets. Only after his aide, the Chevalier du Buysson, cried out the baron’s name and rank, did the British cease their attack. De Kalb was carried from the field and propped up against a tree with a wagon alongside. He leaned against the wagon, his head down, and was slowly bleeding to death. It was reported that not until Cornwallis rode by and recognized the American leader, that he was taken to a residence in Camden and cared for by British surgeons. He died three days later.

Stragglers Pursued

Militiamen and the remnants of the Continentals had scattered in small groups or by themselves. Tarleton’s Legion continued to chase after the fleeing Americans; for more than twenty miles they cut down or captured men. The rebel army’s entire baggage, camp equipment, ammunition, and stores fell to the enemy. Beaten men looking for leadership and a chance to escape the relentless pursuit and the growing pang of hunger stumbled on for mile after mile. They found themselves in a country swarming with loyalist enemies. There were no orders where to assemble. They trudged onward, dragging tired and worn out bodies, some making it to Charlotte. General Gist came in with a few men. General Smallwood arrived there with only a handful. They formed and pushed on. Sergeant Major Seymour wrote in his journal, “We assembled at Salisbury the few that were left… this being the first place we made any halt… from here we marched on the 24^th under the command of General Smallwood, directing our rout for Hillsborough, which we reached with much difficulty on the 6^th of September, two hundred miles from Camden.”

Casualties

There is no accurate list of American casualties. It has been estimated that 650 of the Continentals, nearly the army’s entire strength of experienced regular troops, were killed or captured, the wounded were taken prisoner. The North Carolina militia suffered about 100 killed or wounded (mostly from British pursuit) with 300 captured. Only three Virginians were wounded, the advantage of clearing out rapidly as soon as the enemy began their assault. British losses amounted to 324 of all ranks, two officers and sixty six men killed, eighteen officers and two hundred and seven wounded, eleven missing. Some of the Maryland Continental troops managed to escape through the swamps however the Delaware regiment suffered the most, basically ceasing to exist. In all, thirty American officers were killed, wounded, or captured, a huge blow to future attempts at reorganizing units to offer resistance to a British offensive.

And What of General Gates?

From his initial order to send Colonel Stevens’ Virginians into battle, he never spoke another word. When the militia broke and ran, he joined the panic stricken militiamen in their desperate flight for safety. The only difference between him and the green civilian soldiers, many falling prey to Tarleton’s savage horse pursuit, was that the commanding general had the fastest horse in the army. His mount, a well known racer, carried the hero of Saratoga to safety, leaving his army engaged in a momentous and tragic struggle. Later that day, the tireless steed landed his master in Charlotte, sixty miles from the field of honor. Gates reputation would never recover. He continued his swift flight, not halting until reaching Hillsborough, North Carolina, two hundred miles in four days, a feat rarely accomplished by even the fastest riders. For the next couple of months he would organize the remains of his tattered army while Congress mulled over his replacement. His perceived cowardice and rapid flight to safety at Camden would forever more be made the theme of unsparing ridicule. When Gates accepted the southern army, his friend, General Charles Lee, who had been discredited at the Battle of Monmouth, had given his advice, “take care lest your northern laurels turn to southern willows.” It seemed fate played its hand as the hero of Saratoga would never again order men in combat. Gates was not tried for his conduct at Camden, his influential friends of New England, particularly John Adams, would have none of it. He returned to Washington’s army at Newburg, New York in 1783, however he did not receive a field command, quietly retiring from the army the following year.

Camden’s Aftermath

Historian John Fiske amply wrote, “for the second time within three months, the American army in the south had been swept out of existence… it was the most disastrous defeat ever inflicted on an American army.” What was left of the southern army was in a deplorable condition; barely 700 had assembled at Hillsborough, North Carolina. Of the original 4,000, almost none of the soldiers who remained were Continental Troops; trained, disciplined soldiers and men who a commander could trust to stand before a charging enemy and fight. For the British, the conquest of the south was well on its way to completion. Georgia and South Carolina remained totally within their control. The stage was set. North Carolina would be next and then on to Virginia. It too would fall, perhaps aided by the British navy and reinforced by a large detachment of Clinton’s ground forces in New York.

Washington’s Choice to Lead the South

Historian Francis Greene summed up America’s next step writing, “Nevertheless, Congress did not despair. As usual when disasters came thickly, it turned to Washington. Having itself chosen the last three commanders, [Robert] Howe, [Benjamin] Lincoln, and [Horatio] Gates, under whom Savannah, Charleston, and Georgia and the Carolinas had been lost, it now called upon Washington to select a commander for the Southern army.” The Commander-in-Chief would finally get his man to counter England’s penetration in the south. General Nathanael Greene, who was commanding West Point after the traitor General Benedict Arnold vacated the position, was called upon on October 5, 1780, to take command. Fiske wrote of Greene, “in every campaign since the beginning of the war [Greene] had been Washington’s right arm; and for indefatigable industry, for strength and breadth of intelligence, and for unselfish devotion to the public service, he was scarcely inferior to the commander-in-chief.”

Greene would prove to be the man for the job. His genius would shine – fighting a guerrilla war, organizing hit and run tactics while staying one step ahead of Cornwallis’ troops, dividing his army before a superior force when necessary, leading the British deeper and deeper into the heart of America which dwindled his enemy’s supplies through attrition, and perhaps most importantly, knowing when it was time to pull his forces together for a major fight. Each time withdrawing when appropriate to keep his army whole, knowing the ultimate battle was coming. Greene would be destined to lead his enemy to where the final strike would fall, ending the matter once and for all and driving England to the peace table where the birth of a new nation waited.

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Further reading on Revolutionary War Journal

Battle of White Plains

Battle of Pelham

Battle of Kip’s Bay

Gowanus Creek at the Battle of Long Island

Resourses

Bancroft, George. History of the American Revolution in Three Volumes. 1852: Richard Bentley, New Burlington St., London, UK.

Eugenia, Burney. Colonial South Carolina. 1970: T. Nelson, Camden, NJ.

Fiske, John. The American Revolution in Two Volumes. 1891: Houghton Mifflin & Co., New York, NY.

Greene, Francis Vinton. The Revolutionary War and the Military Policy of the United States. 1911: Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, NY.

Gordon, William D.D. The History of the Rise, Progress and Establishment of the Independence of the United States of America: Including an Account of the Late War, and of the Thirteen Colonies. Vol. II 1801: Printed for Samuel Campbell by John Woods, New York, NY.

Harvey, Robert. A Few Bloody Noses, The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution. 2002: The Overlook Press, Woodstock & New York, NY.

Lossing, Benson. The Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution in Two Volumes. 1852: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York, NY.

Piecuch, James. The Battle of Camden, A Documented History. 2006: The History Press, Charleston, South Carolina.

Ramsay, David M.D. The History of the American Revolution in Two Volumes Vol. I. 1789: Aitken & Son, Philadelphia, PA.

Smith, David. Camden, 1780; The Annihilation of Gates’ Grand Army. 2016: Bloomsbury Publishing, New York, NY.

Trevelyan, Sir George Otto, Bart. The Revolutionary War Vol. III. 1922: Longmans, Green & Co., London, UK & New York, NY.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. 1952: MacMillan Publ., New York, NY. 2011: Skyhorse Publ., New York, NY.