By Harry Schenawolf, author of the Shades of Liberty Series about African American soldiers in the American Revolution.
Fought on November 16, 1776 on the island of Manhattan, just north of New York City, the Battle of Fort Washington almost became the next to last chapter in what might have been a failed rebellion in a misguided cause. The huge loss of men and supplies, critical in its timing as the army was disintegrating from ending enlistments and desertions, was yet another nail in the coffin that loomed over America’s chances for independence. Citizen soldiers – planters, farmers, merchants, mechanics, artisans, and politicians, with their amateur leaders, demonstrated their inexperience, indecision, and incredible ineptitude in deciding to retain Fort Washington’s garrison. The eighteenth century was also an age where honor played a large factor in men’s decisions. More often than not, critical decisions were based not solely on information and one’s experience, but one’s honor. A gentleman’s decision and opinions were sacred to his honor and as such, leaders like Washington treaded carefully when questioning the motives and reasoning behind their decisions. This may have been the case why Washington, who had his doubts, accepted his subordinate, General Nathanael Greene’s assurance that the garrison could sustain an attack. After an analysis of circumstances leading up to its defense, the terrain, the fort itself both physical and its purpose (in which it had failed), the numbers of Americans posted to defend it, the numbers of enemy, armaments, and most importantly, the goal or objective by maintaining an isolated post in Manhattan, cut off from all support, one can only scratch one’s head and ask why didn’t the Americans get the hell out when they could?
Early on in the war, Washington rarely gave a direct order, often referring to Councils of Wars’ consensus or his subordinate’s opinions. It appeared that he either questioned his own military knowledge and gut feelings or he was cautious, not wanting to solely carry the weight of failure if the proverbial ‘shit hit the fan’ resulted. Historians tend to favor Washington’s lack of self-confidence that surfaced time again. However, after Trenton and Princeton, he became more assertive; as one who grows with the job. He improved at pressing his decisions, though still blundering at times, evidenced by ignoring Howe’s flanking movement at Brandywine Creek and the Chew House at the Battle of Germantown. Colonel Moses Hazen perhaps best expressed it when he wrote after the defeat at Brandywine, “…he [Washington] is no more than a man and that as such it is possible he may be subject to some errors as well as some others…”
The fall of Fort Washington was one of the greatest errors and disasters of the war for the Americans, right up there with General Benjamin Lincoln’s surrender of the southern army at Charleston, South Carolina. But by the time Lincoln turned his army over to the British, it was later in the war and the American army was by then well established. The fall of Fort Washington came at a critical time when Washington’s army was evaporating due to ending enlistments and desertions. Supplies and equipment were dear and what was available did not meet the army’s needs. The sudden loss of one quarter of Washington’s manpower, including most of their cannon and a huge percentage of critical supplies and ammunition, was a near fatal blow to the cause. The blame for it rests upon the shoulders of Major General Nathanael Greene and Colonel Robert Magaw, the fort’s commander, for their inexplicable infatuation in attempting to hold the fort. But it also rests upon those of Washington, for his vacillation and indecision when by prompt and decisive action, he could have prevented his inferior officers from persisting in their suicidal folly.[1] Of the 230 American officers made prisoner, most would be paroled. But the 2,607 private soldiers who surrendered that day, many barely past their fifteenth birthday, they would languish in makeshift prisons and sordid prison ships anchored in New York’s Harbor. Most would never see their families again, dying before the war ended from malnutrition and disease.
Fort Washington was anything but a fort. It even failed to stop British shipping, the reason it was built
The fortification affectionally called Fort Washington sat atop the highest point on the island of Manhattan and a lofty plateau of rock schist, the bedrock upon which Manhattan lays. Extending from Harlem Heights in northern Manhattan to Spuyten Duyvil Creek, spanned by the King’s Bridge, was a distance of about four miles. This area was a narrow tongue of high land lying between the Harlem River to the east and the Hudson on the west, its width was about three-quarters of a mile. High rocky cliffs of approximately one hundred feet bordered the banks of each river. Along the Hudson, a narrow hill rose up from the cliffs, one mile long and 230 feet above the water; this was called Mount Washington (today it is Washington Heights). Along the Harlem River was called Laurel Hill, nearly as high as Mt. Washington. Between the two hills, a narrow valley or gorge, the Boston Post Road, the main highway from New York City to Boston, ran along this valley from Harlem to Kingsbridge and into Westchester County. The sides of both Laurel Hill and Mt. Washington were steep, rocky, and rugged as well as densely wooded. [See attached map of upper Manhattan].
On Mt. Washington, Colonel Rufus Putnam, cousin of Major General Israel Putnam and the American army’s chief engineer, had laid the lines for a fort in July of 1776. General Charles Lee had arrived in New York City at the start of the year to plan for the defense of New York City. He had concentrated on lower Manhattan and Long Island. When it became apparent that British ships would attempt to sail up the Hudson River, thereby flanking the American army, plans were put into effect to construct a pair of forts on both sides of the Hudson to prevent such a move; Fort Washington on Manhattan and Fort Constitution, later Fort Lee, on the Jersey side. Cannon, as large as 32 pounders, would be positioned to shell any ships attempting to cross between the gauntlet set up by the two forts. Hulks were to be sunk to hinder passage as well as a chevaux de fries[2] that would stretch across the Hudson. The 3rd and 5th Pennsylvania regiments, under the command of Colonels John Shee and Robert Magaw, would erect the fort and nearby redoubts throughout July and into August.
The rather crude and hastily built fort was a pentagonal earthwork with five bastions. It covered about four acres of ground and was a simple, open fortification with a surrounding abatis[3], but no ditch and none of the usually additions associated with a well-constructed fort. There were no casemates, no bombproofs, no barracks, no buildings of any sort except ‘a wooden magazine and some offices. There was no fuel nor water as a well could not be dug and water had to be hauled up from the river, 230 feet below. According to Captain Alexander Graydon (of Company B of the 4th Pennsylvanian) in his “Memoirs”, there were no outworks except “an incipient one at the north, nor any of those exterior, multiplied obstacles and defenses, that… could entitle it to the name of fortress, in any degree capable of withstanding a siege…”[4] Half a mile north of the fort, on the high plateau and commanding a steep incline to its summit, a small redoubt was erected containing a battery of three guns. South of the fort was a long decline, some two miles, to Harlem Heights and the former American line during the September 16th Battle of Harlem Heights.
The fort was never built to sustain a siege. Like that of Fort Lee on the other side of the Hudson along the Palisades of New Jersey, its sole purpose was to prevent British shipping from sailing up the Hudson and into the northern Highlands. So too, it was to safeguard the chevaux de fries and sunken hulks that laced the river between the two forts. In both instances the two forts failed miserably. The chevaux de fries and sunken hulks were designed to slow down and hopefully halt the ships so the forts’ cannon could do grave damage. On Oct. 9th, two British ships slipped past the obstacles and the American shelling was able to do little or no damage. On November 7th, three British ships easily sailed around the obstructions placed in the river and only sustained minor damage by the shelling of both forts. This further questioned the forts’ usefulness which Washington took note. On November 8th, he wrote to General Greene, who had overall command of both forts, “The late passage of the three vessels up the North River… is so plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions we have thrown into it…If we cannot prevent vessels passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit can not be had?” Greene wrote back the next day that he acknowledged that the forts had failed in their objective, but did not recommend that they be abandoned instead writing “But upon the whole I cannot help thinking the garrison is of advantage, and I cannot conceive the garrison to be in any great danger…”[5] Since both forts had proved their uselessness in halting British shipping, there appeared to be little if any reason to sustain the garrisons, especially at Fort Washington which was poorly constructed, undermanned to sustain any sort of siege, let alone throw back a frontal attack, and with the American army withdrawn from Manhattan, totally isolated from all other support.
Events leading to the assault on Fort Washington
After British Commanding General William Howe’s successful invasion of lower Manhattan on Sept. 15, 1776, and occupancy of New York City, Washington’s army entrenched along a line that extended east to west across Harlem Heights, effectively drawing a line in the sand. The very next morning, September 16th, Washington saw an opportunity to attack probing British forces; the proceeding Battle of Harlem Heights drove the British from the field before additional reinforcements brought the battle to a close. Both sides remained stationary until Howe decided to try and flank the rebel position. He loaded his troops in transports and shipped up the East River to Long Island Sound. He landed in Westchester County on Thong’s Neck on Oct. 12th, behind the Americans still manning the lines at Harlem Heights. A council of war was convened on Oct. 16th while the British were still at Thong’s Neck awaiting artillery and supplies. It was voted to move the main army north, but to leave a garrison behind to hold Fort Washington.
Troops were hastily marched north, arriving at White Plains before Howe who had advanced slowly. Washington and his generals concurred to keep a force in northern Manhattan to protect Fort Washington, as the fort still housed its cannon and maintained its objective along with Fort Lee across the Hudson, to shell British shipping trying to slip up river. Colonels Magaw’s and Shee’s Pennsylvanians, around 700 troops, had constructed the fort and had remained along with a detachment of rangers and others under Lt. Colonel Lambert Cadwalader, to guard the old lines at Harlem Heights. When Howe shipped his main force north, he left General Percy, along with three brigades, to maintain the British position facing the rebel line at Harlem Heights.
At White Plains, Washington quickly entrenched and a pitched battle was fought on October 28th. The Americans forfeited Chatterton Hill, on their far right, but maintained their main lines. British General Howe’s troops, numbering around 20,000, took possession of the old American lines when a few days after the battle, Washington moved his army further north to North Castle. For four days the British made no hostile move towards Washington’s position, outside an insignificant cannonade on Nov. 1st with General Heath’s Division, acting as rear guard. Expecting another attack, the Americans busied themselves constructing earthworks at North Castle. Within days, it appeared the rebels had once more pulled a rabbit from the hat. When Howe’s army approached the rebel entrenchments, the British commander looked upon what seemed to be an impregnable defense of three formidable redoubts with a line of earthen works to the front. Washington, crafty as his nickname the fox, had his men pull up cornstalks and layered them tops in and clods out, with additional earth sprinkled over the sod. It did the trick. General Howe decided not to assault the American lines and subsequently altered his plans.
On November 5th, American picquets discovered that the British advance sentinels had withdrawn and soon after it became apparent that Howe’s army was on the march to the southwest. The rebellious soldiers were esthetic. After having their noses bloodied while chased from Long Island and the city itself, they stood their ground and Howe refused to contest their stance. Besides that, Westchester County was a smorgasbord of food and drink; full bellies were not had in this army for several weeks. But more than one ‘camp side general’ asked the obvious question, what was Howe up to and where were the redcoats going? Even Washington was intrigued, having written to Congress, “a matter of much conjecture and speculation.” He did chance a guess and waged that Howe would send part of his army into New Jersey to make a stab at Philadelphia, while the other would invest Fort Washington.
Why was Fort Washington, proven to be ineffective, not abandoned and the garrison of nearly 2,900 men, along with critical supplies of food, tents, blankets, ammunition, and cannon not withdrawn?
General Nathanael Greene from Rhode Island, Washington’s prodigy who had risen from the ranks as a private to become a major general in one year’s time, insisted that the garrison should not be abandoned. For reasons that mainly speculation can only offer a clue, Greene was under the delusion that the post could hold out against a concerted attack and even a long siege. He was also convinced that at anytime the men and supplies could be drawn off, even in the face of a British assault. Correspondence between Greene and his commanding general shows that Greene, though committed to his opinion that the fort could withstand an attack by the British army, sought a firm direction from Washington to that effect. What eventually transpired is that Greene never received a direct order from Washington to maintain the garrison or to abandon it. Instead, true to form, Washington basically left it up to his young, inexperienced general to do what he thought was best.
As early as October 31st, when Howe’s army was still situated on the old American lines at White Plains, the question had arisen whether the Americans should try to hold the fort and “all the ground from King’s bridge to the lower lines,” meaning the old American lines at Harlem Heights. Greene, given the responsibility of overall command of forts Lee and Washington, asked Washington for his opinion. He wrote on the 31st, “…If we attempt to hold the ground, the garrison must still be reinforced, but if the garrison is only to draw into Mount Washington and keep that, the number of troops is too large.” In other words, if Washington intended to hold the four miles of terrain between Harlem Heights and Kingsbridge, then more men were needed. But if they were to hold the fort only, that sat atop of Mount Washington, then the fort was too small to accommodate the present troops deployed in the region. Washington’s secretary wrote back on Nov. 5th, stating that Washington deferred the decision to Greene. It was up to Greene to either defend the entire region or draw men to the fort, and as such, if he were to try and defend the line from Harlem Heights to Kingsbridge, he would need far more men than what was posted to garrison both the fort and maintain the lines at Harlem Heights. Washington’s secretary wrote, “the holding or not holding the grounds between Kingsbridge and the lower lines depends upon so many circumstances that it is impossible for him [Washington] to determine the point. He submits it entirely to your discretion.”
Washington would not, or could not decide what to do about Fort Washington and instead left it up to his junior officer. Greene did just that. He decided to defend the entire region and to do so, he took in upon himself to reinforce Magaw in the fort. Of the original 700 Pennsylvanians in Magaw and Shee’s regiments, various additions had been made from time to time so by the end of October there were about 1,200 men on the island. After Greene’s Oct. 31st letter to Washington, and while waiting for a reply, the Rhode Islander started to send troops across the Hudson. Lt. Colonel Moses Rawlings’ regiment of 250 Maryland and Virginia riflemen, Colonel Philip Burr Bradley’s 250 Connecticut levies under Lt. Colonel Thomas Hobby[6], and Colonel William Baxter with 200 Bucks County Pennsylvania militiamen including Colonel George Michael Swoope’s regiment, both from the Flying Camp[7], were sent over along with small detachments from Fort Lee. Lieutenant Colonel Lambert Cadwalader was already posted at Harlem Heights along with Knowlton’s Rangers[8], parts of Colonel Samuel Miles’[9] force, and Colonel Samuel John Atlee’s[10] old regiments, with some additional small detachments, such as escaped the Long Island defeat. The artillery numbered around one hundred men under Captain William Pierce. All in all, Magaw’s troops had been raised to a little over 2,800 men. Far too many to crowd in and hold the small fort, yet far too little to man the two-and-a-half-mile line in which a council back in September determined would need at least 10,000 men to properly defend.
When it became apparent that Howe’s army was on the march, heading south back towards the city, a council of war was convened on November 6th. It was decided that, “supposing the enemy to be retreating towards New York [the city]” it would be “proper to throw a body of troops into new Jersey immediately,” and that three thousand men should take post at Peekskill and the passes of the Highlands to protect any move by the enemy towards New England. General Heath, with four brigades under his command, would take command at Peekskill which would become the future headquarters for the Highlands Army and at times, the main army throughout the war’s duration. Major General Charles Lee would remain at North Castle (just north of White Plains) with three divisions, his, including Generals Sullivan’s and Spencer’s division (two brigades each). On paper, Lee’s strength was listed as 10,000, but in reality, he had only 5,500 men fit for duty. Washington was to take 2,000 men and join Greene’s detachment of 3,500 men at Fort Lee. They would act as a barrier if Howe decided to march upon Philadelphia. Amazing, there was no mention of Fort Washington at this council nor any consideration to abandon the fort and nearby works.
Washington had his doubts about the ability of the fort to withstand a direct attack and after the British ships slipped by the fort’s defenses, yet again, on Nov. 7th, he wrote to Greene the next day. He questioned the inefficacy of the obstructions and the purpose for holding a post in which there was no benefit writing “…I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mt. Washington…” And yet, with clear proof that the fort was useless and his gut telling him to abandon the works and save what men and supplies he could, Washington again deferred the decision to his youthful subordinate writing, “…but as you are on the spot, leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last.” While there was still time to salvage much needed armaments, supplies, and troops, the Commander-in-Chief delayed issuing the orders to evacuate a post in which he believed would be lost if attacked. General Greene, on the following day replied that he did not think the garrison in any danger, and that it could be drawn off at any time. He believed, too, that the stores could be removed at the last moment, in spite of an attack; and again, he called attention to the advantage of holding the post as an annoyance to the enemy. No further communications passed on the subject as Washington secured troop postings in the Highlands. He rode to the Jersey side of the Hudson and reached Greene’s headquarters, about two miles from Fort Lee, on the 14th. He appeared surprised to learn that no steps had been taken to withdraw men or stores from Mount Washington.
Planned Defense and Attack
Along with Greene, Colonel Magaw believed firmly that the fort and defensive positions would hold out against any force until December. His confidence was bolstered by the fact that his men would be atop of steep terrain upon which they could hurl shot and missiles down upon any attacking force. He assured himself that the lines at Harlem Heights were strong and could withstand any assault. For weeks, the three earthen lines, including redoubts at the Heights, had been strengthened by the main army before they withdrew to the north. Magaw would remain in the fort with a small detachment to direct the movements of his men stationed in defensive positions from Harlem Heights and along the Harlem and Hudson Rivers. The defenses were to held as long as possible and when necessary, the fort and the intrenchments immediately surrounding it were to be the point of retreat.
At the northern end of Mt. Washington, half a mile from the fort, Rawlings and his Maryland and Virginian riflemen held a small redoubt and a battery of three guns from Major Thomas Proctor’s 1st Pennsylvania State Artillery Company under the command of Captain John Martin Strobach. Strobach was not present during the battle. His First Lieutenant Samuel Finley was taken captive after the fort fell and most likely was in command of the guns at Rawlings redoubt. The first was under the command of . In a couple of fleches[11] on Laurel Hill, near the Harlem River, Colonel Baxter and his militiamen were posted on the heights.[12] Two miles to the south, Lt. Colonel Cadwalader had Magaw’s and Shee’s Pennsylvanians, Bradley’s regiment (commanded by Lt. Col. Hobby), Knowlton’s rangers, and the other detachments from Miles and Atlee’s men holding the line at Harlem Heights – about 800 in all. Minor detachments were posted at other points along the line. As such, it was an ambitious plan to maintain a circuit of nearly five miles with so small a number of men that necessity included large gaps in the line which could not be manned.
By early November, General Howe had decided to cease an ineffectual pursuit of Washington’s army, and employed himself in the reduction of King’s Bridge and Fort Washington. Once this was accomplished, he could then push on to Philadelphia and close the year’s operations with the occupation of that place.[13] He left White Plains on Nov. 5th and marched to the Hudson River at Dobb’s Ferry. German General Knyphausen, who had lately arrived with a second division of German mercenaries, had already been dispatched to king’s Bridge.
After a delay in securing supplies and positioning men, the entire British force marched on the 12th to Kingsbridge and dispositions were begun to assault the American lines. Howe would attack with 8,000 men against Magaw’s 2,800, a nearly three to one ratio. They would do so simultaneously upon the three points that Magaw had set his defenses. Howe was confident for immediate success for he had intelligence of Magaw’s strength and troop displacements. A week earlier, Magaw’s adjutant, William Demont, had crept into Lord Percy’s camp, just south of Harlem Heights, and given him the plans for the fort along with information about the works, the garrison, including plans for defense. Percy had promptly passed this on to Howe.
Lord Percy would attack Cadwalader stationed at the old American lines at Harlem Heights. He would command a brigade of Hessians and nine British battalions, about 2,000 men. Once they broke through the defenses, theirs would be a long gradual climb from the south to the fort. General Edward Mathew, commander of the elite Brigade of Guards, led with two battalions of light infantry and two of the Guards supported by two battalions of grenadiers and the 33rd Regiment under General Lord Cornwallis, approximately 3,000 men. They were to cross the Harlem River from the east and assault Baxter’s militia on Laurel Hill. General Wilhelm von Knyphausen had claimed the honor of initiating the main attack on the northern defenses of the fort using 3,000 German troops alone. It would prove to be the most difficult resulting in the highest number of British forces’ casualties. He would face Rawling’s incredibly accurate riflemen and three cannon loaded with grape in a steep, almost cliff-like climb to the summit. Besides the three-prong attack, the 42nd Highlanders under Colonel Sterling would scale Laurel Hill from the Harlem side at a point between Cadwalader’s position and the fort, near the Morris Mansion that had been Washington’s headquarters while he was at Harlem Heights. Though designed as a feint to confuse the Americans, the Highlander’s presence, the famed ‘Black Watch’, would threaten Cadwalader’s rear, forcing the American to abandon the line and order an immediate retreat to the fort.
Summons to surrender and Washington is rowed across the Hudson to look for himself
While Washington was at Fort Lee, still pondering if the garrison and defensive lines at Harlem Heights should be withdrawn back over the Hudson, British operations to capture the fort had begun. On the night of November 14th, thirty British flatboats were sent up the Hudson. They drew past the forts unnoticed, through Spuyten Duyvil Creek that formed the northern most water route of the island, and down into the Harlem River. As the sun rose on Nov. 15th, the adjutant general of the British army, Lt. Colonel James Paterson, along with several other mounted officers, approached Fort Washington under a white flag with a drummer beating a parley. They customarily demanded the fort’s surrender. Patterson’s message was direct, that all would be put to the sword unless the Americans complied within two hours. Magaw sent a note to Greene at Fort Lee, but did not wait for a reply. He emphatically answered Howe, stating that “…give me leave to assure his Excellency that actuated by the most glorious cause that mankind ever fought in, I am determined to defend this post to the last extremity.”
Greene concurred with Magaw’s decision and sent Magaw a message to stand firm and wait for further orders. He forwarded the news to Washington who had set up his headquarters at Hackensack, New Jersey. Without waiting to hear back from Washington, Greene, along with General Israel Putnam, who had “an overweening confidence” in the impregnability of the fort, crossed the Hudson to Fort Washington to meet with Magaw. At 9 PM, Washington arrived at Fort Lee, but Greene had yet to return. He bordered a boat and was halfway across the river when he encountered Greene and Putnam on their way back. Washington wrote, “I had partly crossed the North River when I met General Putnam and General Greene, who were just returning from thence, and they informed me that the troops were in high spirits and would make a good defense, and it being late at night, I returned.” By requesting the garrison’s surrender early that morning and a full day before the assault, Howe had, by design or necessity to prepare the attack, allowed the Americans a day and a night to evacuate their position. During the night-time evacuation of Brooklyn in the face of the British army, just two and a half months earlier, Washington had already proved he could withdraw an entire army in less time. But it was not to be. The next day, November 16th, American rank and file, confident in their leaders’ decisions for them to remain, would fight like demons in a lost cause to withstand overwhelming odds against one of the world’s finest military forces.
On the morning of November 16th, Washington still contemplated an evacuation of the fort. He was rowed over to Fort Washington to view the defenses for himself and “to determine what was best to be done.” He was accompanied by Generals Greene, Putnam, and Hugh Mercer, the last commanded the Flying Corps stationed in New Jersey in which two of his regiments had been sent over. They no longer boarded their boat than Howe launched his attack with a cannonade. The American commanders looked on helplessly while the decision to fight or flight was taken from them. Greene wrote, “but just at the instant we stepped on board the boat the enemy made their appearance on the hill.” The generals persisted and ordered to be rowed across to the fort. Upon landing, they cut partially across the island to just south of the Morris House, Washington’s previous headquarters. Greene continued, “There we all stood in a very awkward situation. As the disposition was made, and the enemy advancing, we durst not attempt to make any new disposition; indeed we saw nothing amiss.” Though Greene remained confident, Washington, who had deep misgivings about defending the fort, remained skeptical. Though his subordinates each volunteered to remain to command the defense, Washington ordered they all be rowed back to Fort Lee. Within fifteen minutes of their departure, the British captured the ground upon which they had stood.
The Attack, November 16, 1776
Most of Magaw’s men remained in their positions outside the fort in three key positions: a half mile north at the top of a steep and precipitous climb that was littered with fallen trees and obstacles, to the east along Laurel Hill, so too a difficult uphill slog for an enemy facing fire, and a mile and a half further south, along the three old Harlem Heights lines. He kept a small detachment within the fort and sent runners to oversee his distant postings. Howe therefore initiated a three-prong attack to overwhelm these positions and drive them back towards the fort where a cannonade would be severely destructive to troops crowded in the fort’s small confines, forcing a surrender. It took all morning and into the early afternoon, but in all aspects, the crafty British general, with highly competent subordinates at his command and professional rank and file, was successful.
At a little after 7 AM, the battle began with a heavy and protracted cannonade. For two hours and more, twenty-one guns from British batteries on Fordham Height on the eastern side of the Harlem River pounded the American positions. The frigate Pearl, stationed in the Hudson just south of Colonel Rawling’s riflemen and north of the fort, poured her broadsides against the rebel post.
To the south, Lord Percy advanced against Cadwalader and unlimbered his field artillery. Having driven in a small outpost, he crossed the Hollow Way that had been severely contested during the Battle of Harlem Heights on Sept. 16th, and gained the heights above it with minor casualties. Once over the ridge, he approached the American lines in column. Well within range, the British fieldpieces and a howitzer opened fire and Cadwalader replied with his lone six-pounder. And just when it appeared that Percy would draw his men into line of battle and propel his force against the Americans, his columns inclined to the left and halted behind a section of forest. There they would remain inactive for some time. Though confusing to the rebel defenders, Percy was ordered to delay his attack because key to Howe’s plans, the assaults had to be made simultaneously. Because of adverse conditions of the tide and by “some neglect not foreseen before,” Generals Mathew’s and Cornwallis’s forces that were detailed to cross the Harlem River and assault Colonel Baxter’s position on Laurel Hill had been delayed.
By 11 AM, the flatboats conveying two brigades of English troops finally landed first Mathew’s and then Cornwallis’ men on the northern end of Laurel Hill below Baxter’s position. While crossing the river and on landing, Mathew’s light infantry were under a galling rebel fire, but with characteristic determination, they leapt from their transports and swarmed up Laurel Hill. Supported by cannon on Fordham Heights, they clawed up the steep and wooded slope into the guns of Baxter’s men. Cornwallis, commanding the Guards, his 33rd Regiment, and a battalion of grenadiers, crossed without injury and followed Mathew’s light infantry. Soon after, Colonel Baxter, who was in the thick of the fight, was shot down and mortally wounded. Leaderless, his militia broke off the attack and as prearranged, retreated back towards the fort to their west. While Mathew’s and Cornwallis’ men had just begun their assault, the main attack to the north had started.
Before sunrise, General Knyphausen’s Germans had left their camp on the mainland side of the Harlem River. By 7 AM, about the time the British guns opened up, they had crossed Kingsbridge where they proceeded in two columns towards their staging point. The right was led by Colonel Johann Rall (who a little over five weeks later would face Washington at the Battle of Trenton) and the left was under Major General Martin Schmidt. They gathered at the ground below Colonel Rawling’s riflemen and their three cannon, but like Lord Percy, they had to wait until word that Cornwallis’ and Mathew’s flatboats had landed at Laurel Hill.
It was not until after ten o’clock that they were ordered to attack. A dozen fieldpieces were dragged forward and opened up on the riflemen perched high on the cliff-like summit above. Rall led his column to the right through a break in the wooded hills along the Hudson and toward the north end of Mt. Washington. Knyphausen, with Schmidt’s column, kept to the left and the easterly side of that elevation. They had to wade through a swamp and break through a triple abatis of trees to get to the base of the hill in which they needed to climb.[14]
Rall’s troops also had to pass through “an excessive thick wood,” to get to the steep incline. Andreas Wiederhold, a Hessian captain with thirty men under his command led Knyphausen’s attack. He wrote in his journal that “we stood facing their crack troops and their riflemen all on this almost inaccessible rock which lay before us, surrounded by swamps and three earthworks, one above the other.” According to John Reuber, a soldier in Rall’s regiment, “[we] marched forward up the hill and were obliged to creep along up the rocks, one falling down alive, another being shot dead. We were obliged to drag ourselves by the beech-tree bushes up the height where we could not really stand.”[15]
As both Rall’s and Schmidt’s men struggled up the long and steep incline, grape and round shot belched from cannon down upon them, followed by a shower of bullets. The riflemen in the redoubt and those hidden behind rocks and trees all along the heights poured a well-aimed and deadly fire on their enemy, but the Hessians under Rall and Waldeckers in Schmidt’s command persevered. Given the most difficult portion of the attack, the Germans would sustain the highest number of casualties, more than two thirds of those killed and wounded that day. Though gaining laurels from the British command for their stalwart performance, American Colonel Graydon commented afterwards that, as the Germans “had been bought by his Britannic majesty, he had an unquestionable right to make a free use of them; and this seemed to be the conviction of General Howe.”[16]
For nearly two hours, the Germans pressed forward against the riflemen’s stubborn defense. The attackers threw themselves against insurmountable conditions that felled many of those in the vanguard creeping upwards, to be replaced by those below waiting their turn to crawl into hell. General Knyphausen himself “at all times could be found in the thickest of the fight, where resistance and attack was the hottest, as he tore down the fences with his own hands to urge the men on…He was exposed like a common soldier to the frightful cannon and shrapnel fire, as well as to the rifle shots, and it is wonderful that he came off without being killed or wounded,” wrote Wiederhold.[17] When Rall and come near to the top, Knyphausen “made a sudden face to the right” against the side of the hill assigned to his force and met the enemy’s fire head on. But by now, the rifles of the Americans had become fouled by the frequent and long continued use. Man, after man found that he could not drive home a bullet in the clogged barrel of his gun. The fire of the defenders waned and at last was too feeble to hold back the enemy, now nearing the top of the ascent. Rifles had no bayonets to repel a charge by the German musketeers. Retreat was inevitable. Rawlings, like Baxter’s militiamen at Laurel Hill, drew his men back towards the fort., gaining it ahead of their pursuers. This proved to be the hottest and longest fight of the day with the most casualties.[18]
It wasn’t until near noon that Lord Percy finally received word that the flatboats had disembarked at Laurel Hill and he was free to continue his attack. He emerged from his wooded cover with his two brigades, one British and the other Hessian under Major General Johann Stirn. The old Harlem Heights line encompassed three earthen works that extended from west to east. As Percy assailed Cadwalader’s lines, he pierced each one, forcing the defenders to retreat to the next barrier. Cornwallis, having been successful against Baxter’s militia, foresaw the eventual retreat of Cadwalader’s forces and realized an opportunity to entrap them.
The 42nd Highlanders under Colonel Sterling, who were detailed to conduct a feint to confuse the Americans, were ordered to join two battalions of the 2nd Brigade and cross the Harlem River and cut off Cadwalader. Magaw was informed of this movement and sent word to Cadwalader who dispatched 150 men under Captains David Lennox, George Tudor, and Evan Edwards, all of the 3rd Pennsylvania, to counter Sterling’s landing. So too Magaw dispatched 100 men to join Cadwalader’s detachment. The rebels poured a heavy fire on the boats from both rifle and musket including an 18-pounder firing grape. They hit 90 of their attackers, but the 800-man force kept coming, backed by British batteries across the river. They swarmed from their transports and climbed the steep slope up from the water’s edge so quickly that they overwhelmed the defenders and captured 170 before they could retreat.
Percy kept pressure on Cadwalader who, with superior enemy numbers before him and an intense battle at his rear, saw no other alternative but to order a general retreat back to the fort. He was closely pursued by Percy and was barely trapped by the encroaching Highlanders. When Cadwalader neared the fort, he halted his men near a small wood and delivered a heavy fire, which for the moment halted the pursuit. By then, the 42nd Highlanders, the famed Black Watch, had arrived and attacked with a vengeance, driving the rebels from the woods and cutting off some to take prisoners. The rest of Cadwalader’s men reached the fort just as Rall’s Hessians arrived within a hundred yards where they took a position behind a large storehouse. Rall immediately sent a white cloth tied to a gun barrel and a drummer at his side to approach and demand the fort’s surrender. Magaw requested he be given four hours to answer and Rall replied he would allow thirty minutes.
Surrender
By 2 PM, around 2,800 Americans were crowded into a fort built for less than half that number. British and German troops pressed in from all sides. Dozens of enemy artillery were trained on the modestly constructed fortification that was devoid of cover. A protracted bombardment would have meant the slaughter of everyone inside. Magaw saw the writing on the wall, however he was encouraged by a note sent from Washington. The Commander-in-Chief witnessed the attack from across the Hudson. Washington later wrote, “I sent a billet to Colonel Magaw directing him to hold out and I would endeavor this evening to bring off the garrison if the fortress could not be maintained, as I did not expect it could, the enemy being possessed of the adjacent ground.” Magaw, hoping to stall the Hessian commander until nightfall, was disheartened when Rall’s ultimatum arrive exactly thirty minutes later. Magaw was given no alternative but to approach General Knyphausen to see if he could get better terms of surrender for his men. The rebel commander was led from the fort and met with Knyphausen. The stern commander was in no mood for delays and demanded the fort’s instant surrender. He offered that officers, including private soldiers, could keep their personal belongings which later proved to be unfounded when all was stripped from the prisoners. Armaments were to stacked and the defenders were to immediately lay down their arms. Magaw had no choice. He offered his sword and sent back word for his men to comply with the enemy’s demands for recapitulation.
The German regiments formed two lines facing each other and the defenders were marched between them to stack their weapons. Accordingly, they were in poor shape from want of food and provisions, having spent several days in the absence of the main army that had retreated north. British officer, Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie wrote in his journal, “Few of them appeared to have a second shirt, nor did they appear to have washed themselves during the campaign. A great many of them were lads under fifteen and old men, and few had the appearance of soldiers. Their odd figures frequently excited the laughter of our soldiers.” American captives were kept on the field of battle and in the fort until the next day, the 17th when they were marched the ten miles to New York City. The officers sought paroles to go home and wait for exchange. However, the rank and file would not be given such treatment. Those who survived the ordeal, many boys barely fifteen years or older, were confined in horrendous prisons for the duration of the war.
Lt. Colonel Rawlings of Maryland and Virginia rifles was wounded in the thigh. Traditionally, wounded officers were immediately paroled after a battle and allowed to return home to await exchange. Rawlings was held in captivitiy until exchanged in December of 1777 or January of 1778. He would finish his war experience manning the prison at Fort Frederick in western Maryland. Some of the riflemen who faced the Hessians to the north of the fort were able to escape. One of the artillerists assigned to one of the three cannon at Rawling’s redoubt escaped and on the night of the 17th, crossed the Hudson and reported to Greene. Greene wrote to Washington the next day that “One of the train of artillery came across the river last night on a raft. By his account the enemy musht have suffered greatly on the north side of Fort Washington Colonel Rawlings regiment was posted there and behaved with great spirit.”
Casualties & American Loss
British casualties were more severe than the Americans, except in the number of prisoners taken. Fifty-nine Americans were killed and ninety-six wounded. The British had a total of seventy-eight killed and three hundred and seventy-four wounded. Of these, the Hessian and Waldecker’s share was substantial – fifty-eight dead and two hundred and seventy-two wounded. But the American loss in prisoners taken and material captured was stupendous. Officers numbered 230 and 2,607 private soldiers fell into the hands of the British. Four days later, on November 20th, General Cornwallis crossed the Hudson from Yonkers and landed 6,000 troops in New Jersey. This time the garrison at Fort Lee did not offer a resistance and fled, evading capture with little time to spare. However, not so the supplies stored at the fort. Between the two forts, Washington and Lee, the British took a total of 146 iron and brass cannon ranging from the smallest to 32 pounders, 12,000 shot and shell, 2,800 muskets, and a startling 400,000 musket cartridges, besides tents, entrenching tools, and precious equipment and provisions that the Americans could not replace, adding to the common soldiers’ sufferings that winter.[19]
Aftermath
“I feel mad, vexed, sick, and sorry,” Green wrote to artillery commander Henry Knox the day after the battle. It appeared, and rightly so, that he was worried for shouldering the blame for the disaster. “Never did I need the consoling voice of a friend more than now,” he continued to Knox, “Happy should I be to see you. This is the most terrible event: its consequences are justly to be dreaded… Pray what is said upon the occasion. A line from you will be very acceptable.” The loss in manpower was staggering for an army whose enlistment would be up in just five weeks. Clearly half of those captured at Fort Washington were experienced Continental Regulars including Pennsylvania riflemen and Knowlton’s Rangers, among the best the Americans had in their army. But the huge loss of critical and much needed supplies and ammunition was a tremendous blow that many could not envision the rebellious army surviving. After chasing Washington across New Jersey, General Cornwallis was so convinced that the war was over but for mopping up operations, that he secured passage to England, only to cancel his plans after Washington’s surprise attack on Trenton.
Washington seemed to try and offer an excuse for why he vacillated on evacuating the fort and not acting on his gut by giving a direct order to abandon the works and draw off the much-needed supplies. He afterwards wrote his elder half-brother Lawrence, “What adds to my mortification is, that this post after the last ships went past it [on November 7th] was held contrary to my wishes and opinions, as I conceived it to be a hazardous one… I did not care to give an absolute order for withdrawing the garrison till I could get round and see the situation of things, and then it became too late, as the fort was invested… I had given it as my opinion to General Greene, under whose care it was, that it would be best to evacuate the place; but as the order was discretionary, and his opinion differed from mine, it unhappily was delayed too long to my great grief.”[20] As earlier stated in this article, this was a pattern that Washington had exacerbated to no end. He often called a council of war and later acted upon a collective decision of those present, demurring to the majority’s opinion, regardless if he himself agreed or not. So too, as at Fort Washington, where he phrased his correspondence to hint at his desires, but did not issue the direct order Greene had wished for. The inexperienced officer, taking it upon himself to do what he thought was right, led to the disaster. Washington would continue with his perchance to avoid a direct order, seen in his somewhat gentle request that General Charles Lee use his discretion to join him while General Cornwallis pursued him across New Jersey.
Joseph Reed, Washington aide-de-camp and more and more his critical adversary, sounded despair in his commander’s actions in a letter to Major General Charles Lee, one many believed who should take the hapless Commander-in-Chief’s place. He wrote to Lee five days after the battle and the day after the loss of Fort Lee, on November 21st: “…unluckily, General Greene’s judgement was contrary. This kept the General’s mind [Washington’s] – an indecisive mind is one of the greatest misfortunes that can befall an army. How often have I lamented it in this campaign…” Congress did not seek a scape goat for the disaster, instead choosing to take note of its failure and allow the Commander-in-Chief freer rein and greater independence in making on the spot decisions.
Governor Johnathan Trumbull of Connecticut, who had bolstered Washington and the cause of liberty as much as anyone throughout the colonies by supplying provisions and manpower – beyond any other province, was far more proactive. He wrote to the distraught commander advising that “the loss of fort Washington, with so many of our brave men, is indeed a most unfortunate event. But though we are to consider and improve like disappointments, yet we are by no means to despair, – we are in this way to be prepared for help and deliverance.” The governor’s words would be a pretext to what some have written was a miracle. Washington would be chased across New Jersey and into the wilds of Pennsylvania. The entire army was about to go home with enlistments up at the end of the year. Congress had fled Philadelphia towards York. And few, including those politicians who based their lives and fortunes on the rebellion’s success, thought there was any hope of survival. But within five weeks of Fort Washington’s disaster, Washington would prove why he was the best man for the job, and why the British use of the term fox in reference to their nemesis was incredibly accurate.
What became of the American captives?
Of the 2,607 rank and file captives who were led to a grim existence in prisons of converted churches, mills, and on disease-ridden hunks anchored in New York’s Harbor, only 800 were still alive eighteen months later! By war’s end, most of that number had died due to malnutrition and fever. They were stripped of their clothing, given old worn-out garments, and then marched through the streets of the city while subjected to insults from the Loyalist crowds. During the winter of 1776-77, snow would blow in and sweep across the great unheated rooms that served as their dungeons. For the most part, British combat officers behaved correctly but provost personnel in New York acted with brutal severity. “Each morning several frozen corpses were dragged out, thrown into wagons like logs, and then pitched into a large hole. In a brief time, the naked bodies would be exposed because of the weather conditions and afterwards be consumed by swine and wild animals”. Soldier Samuel Young recalls being confined in a stable with 500 men where food was thrown to them, “…in a confused manner, as if to so many hogs, a quantity of old biscuit, broken, and in crumbs, mostly molded, and some of it crawling with maggots… next day a little pork given to each of them, which they were obliged to eat raw”.[21]
Margaret Corbin
As school children, Americans learned all about Molly Pitcher’s feats at the Battle of Monmouth on June 28, 1778. She was a camp follower who aided the soldiers during the battle by bringing them water. When her husband, an artillerist, was wounded, she took over for him by helping to man his field piece. But there was another heroine of the American Revolution who manned a cannon in the heat of battle nearly two years before Molly did so. She was Margaret Corbin. Her husband was also an artillerist. His cannon was posted with Colonel Rawling’s riflemen. When he was killed, she took his place aiming the field piece that belched grape shot down upon the scaling Hessians. She proved to be one of if not the most accurate in placing shot that did the most damage. She did so with such accuracy that her position drew especially heavy fire from the Hessian field pieces at the base of the hill. A severe wound from grapeshot in her shoulder which nearly severed her left arm along with lacerations to her left breast and jaw finally took her out of the action. Because Corbin’s wounds had permanently disabled her, she would receive an accommodation from Congress for her actions that day and later was granted a soldier’s half-pay and the value of a suit of clothes for life as compensation.
What of Fort Washington?
The fort never lived up to its purpose – to halt shipping on the Hudson River. However, for the Germans who scaled the precipice and exacted the highest number of casualties during the assault, there existed a pride of conquest. The request was made and Howe concurred to rename the fort; to the delight of Hessian commanders, Fort Washington became Fort Knyphausen. The smaller redoubts were also renamed. The Laurel Hill redoubt became Fort George [yes, another Fort George on Manhattan Island], and on the northern end of Mouth Washington, the post and redoubt defended by Colonel Rawlings’ riflemen, became Fort Tryon, named for the Royal Governor of New York. Today the plaza in front of Fort Tryon Park and the roadway next to it bears Margaret Corbin’s name. So too a stone monument placed by the 1910 Daughters of the Revolution mark where Rawlings’ redoubt stood.
The area the battle was fought and the precipice upon which the fort commanded, has been renamed Washington Heights. The location of the fort is in Bennett Park, opened in 1929. The New York City’s public park was named for James Gordon Bennett, Sr., newspaper publisher who launched the New York Herald in 1835. He purchased the land in 1871. The park is located between Pinehurst and Fort Washington Avenues and West 183rd and 185th Streets in northern Manhattan. A commemorative monument to the November 16, 1776 battle of marble, bronze and granite, sculptured by Charles R. Lamb, is located on the eastern perimeter wall of the park, and was dedicated in 1901. Bennett Park continues to host the Battle of Fort Washington Reenactments in which the British and Continental army actors converge and stage the battle throughout the park.
Author Rick Atkinson Discusses the 1776 Battles Around New York City – Youtube Video
If you would like to read more about the American Revolution and battles around New York, check out the free previews of great books on Amazon
New Action Series on African Americans who fought in the American Revolution
Of similar interest on Revolutionary War Journal
American Revolutionary War Forces Chain of Command at the Start of the 1776 New York City Campaign
Rifle Companies in the Continental Army – Premier Weapon of the American Revolution
Field Fortifications & Forts in the American Revolution
SOURCE
Archiving Early America, Varsity Tutors. “POW’s During the American Revolution, Rebel Prisoners Detained in North America.”
British Battles. “Battle of Fort Washington”.
Commager, Henry Steele & Morris, Richard B. The Spirit of Seventy-Six, The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participant. 1958, 1995 edition: Da Cap Press, New York, NY.
Conway, Stephen. “To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War” The William and Mary Quarterly Vol. 43, No. 3 (Jul., 1986), pp. 381-407.
Graydon, Alexander. Memoirs of His Own Time, with Reminiscences of the Men and Events of the Revolution. 1846: Edited by John Stockton Littrell, Lindsay & Plakiston, Philadelphia, PA.
Heitman, Francis. Historical Register of the Officers of the Continental Army During the War of Revolution, April 1775 – December 1783. 1914: The Rare Book Publishing Company, New York, NY.
Johnston, Henry P. The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn. 1878: S. W. Green, New York, NY.
Mackenzie, Frederick. Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, Giving a Daily Narrative of his Military Service as an Officer of the Regiment of Royal Welsh Fusiliers During the Years 1775-1781… 2 Volumes. 1930: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
McCullough, David. 1776. 2005: Simon & Schuster, New York, NY.
Schecter, Barnet. The Battle for New York, The City at the Heart of the American Revolution. 2002: Walker Publishing Company, New York, NY.
Smith, General Stephen & Adjuncts Generals. Record of Service of Connecticut Men in the War of the Revolution… 1889: Under the Direction of Adjuncts Generals, Hartford, CN.
Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution. 1952, 2011 edition: Skyhorse Publishing Company, New York, NY.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Ward pg. 274.
[2] Chevaux de fries were typically sharpened stakes that hindered an attacking force. In this case, the obstacle to hinder shipping was an array of logs sunk underwater that stretched between Fort Washington and Fort Lee. The logs were intended to pierce and sink any British ships that passed over it. An opening was left for the passage of American ships, however, after the British learned of the opening from a local resident, they successfully passed through the barrier several times.
[3] Abatis, frequent among fortifications and defensive barriers, were sharpened branches laid in a row with the pointed ends facing outwards to hinder an attacking force.
[4] Ward, pg. 269.
[5] Schecter, pg. 244 – 245.
[6] Colonel Philip Bradley did not accompany his regiment to New York which was under the command of Lt. Col. Thomas Hobby. Hobby, along with nearly 250 men of his regiment would become captive when the garrison fell. Bradley would go on to command the 5th Connecticut Continental Regiment that was formed in 1777.
[7] The flying camp, a large force on paper of about 10,000 troops, were mainly militiamen from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. They were stationed in New Jersey and under the command of Washington’s good friend Doctor and General Hugh Mercer, a Scotsman who had fought at the Battle of Culloden for Bonnie Prince Charlie. They were labeled the flying camp because Congress believed that a mobile force was necessary to be sent where ever there was an immediate emergency. Greene took it upon himself to draw some men from this force that basically had done little in the year since they were formed. By the end of the year, between desertions and ending enlistments, the force was disbanded. Mercer would later be killed during the Battle of Princeton.
[8] Colonel Thomas Knowlton had formed what would be the first intelligence gathering force of the American Army. The special ops force of approximately 250 men consisted mainly of men from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and the wilderness areas of New Hampshire and the New Hampshire Grants (future Vermont). Skilled backwoodsmen toting rifles rubbed shoulders with scholars like Nathan Hale, the young teacher/soldier/spy who was hanged in Manhattan when Washington withdrew his army. Though Knowlton was killed at the Battle of Harlem Heights, Sept. 16th, his outfit continued to scout and probe the enemy lines for Washington. The entire regiment was captured during Fort Washington’s loss, however intelligence companies of skilled, intelligence gathering units remained a fixture in the army. Knowlton’s bust can be seen at the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Virginia.
[9] Colonel Miles force of Pennsylvania riflemen was decimated during the Battle of Long Island. The remains of his men became part of Cadwalader’s force that were posted along the old lines at Harlem Heights when Washington’s army retreated north. Miles was captured at the Battle on Aug. 27, 1776 and later exchanged in April 1778.
[10] Colonel Atlee, commanded a battalion from Pennsylvania during the Battle of Long Island. He and most of his command was captured during the battle. The remains of his outfit were stationed on the old lines of Harlem Heights under Lt. Col. Cadwalader.
[11] Fleches comes from the French word for arrow. Like an arrow head jutting outward from the defensive line toward the enemy, it is part of the outworks of a fortress. Usually placed in front of the point of a bastion to create an additional level of fire. Similar to a rodan, but more pointed with less area between the sides of the ‘arrow’.
[12] Ward, pg. 271.
[13] Johnston, pg. 276.
[14] Ward, pg. 272.
[15] Schecter, pg. 251.
[16] Ibid, pg. 249.
[17] Ibid, pg. 252.
[18] Ward, pg. 273.
[19] Ibid, pg. 274.
[20] Schecter, pg. 256.
[21] Archiving Early American