Fort Ticonderoga: Americans Abandoned The Gibraltar of the North Without a Fight

July 5^th, 1777, Fort Ticonderoga, New York, fell to British General Burgoyne’s forces, however the northern army, consisting largely of continental troops, disciplined and experienced fighters, was saved. But perhaps more importantly, New York and all of New England was ignited. There was no solid bastion left to thwart a British invasion from the north. Men could no longer attend their farms knowing their families and livelihood was protected from the plunder and ravages of a marauding army. Shortly afterwards, an outcry rose throughout the countryside – “Stop Burgoyne.” And instead of reluctance, communities throughout New England began to offer relief to the northern army, substantial assistance in much needed provisions and manpower. And the new commanding general, Horatio Gates, soon discovered he would not suffer from the debilitating needs that had strangled this army. His numbers swelled with hard, determined men who heeded the call to arms and were willing to fight for all that they held dear. Stone and mortar would not be relied upon to halt Burgoyne’s advance, but flesh and blood. The American army would not just offer a wall of resistance, but they would attack, throwing themselves en-mass at the British and Germans in a series of battles that would claim the first British army and lead the colonies toward their destiny.

Fort Ticonderoga was the bedrock of American resistance in the north. A massive fortification with fourteen foot thick parapets that could resist the pounding of the largest cannons. Its towering walls were insurmountable by an attacking force. By all accounts it was impregnable, built to withstand the most protracted siege for months. And after the opening shots fired by the attacking British army…it lasted all of two days. Two days before the Americans, in the cover of darkness, slipped their entire garrison across Lake Champlain and vanished, retreating south and leaving behind most of their supplies and all their cannon. When word filtered out, Americans were in shock. General Burgoyne should have spent weeks digging parallels to affect a siege, while his supplies dwindled, putting his entire campaign in doubt. Instead, he brushed aside the fort like a fly off one’s sleeve and spearheaded his invasion toward the heart of colonial resistance. How could this have happened?

In the spring of 1777, American Major General Arthur St. Clair relieved General “Mad” Anthony Wayne as commander of one of the few permanent fortresses in American, Fort Ticonderoga in New York on Lake Champlain. The immense stone fortification, named Fort Carillon, was built by the French, had withstood a massive attack during the French and Indian War, and was handed over to the British at war’s end who renamed it Ticonderoga (after the Iroquois tekontaroken meaning ‘the junction of two waterways’). The fort was a symbolic bastion of defense, safeguarding the direct waterway from Canada to the British colonies. Since the end of the Seven Years’ War, England had sparsely manned the fort and allowed it to relapse into somewhat ruin. After the Americans’ bloodless capture of the fort on May 10, 1775, most of the heavy guns were removed to dislodge the British from Boston.

Now in American hands, the fort, along with a redoubt at Crown Point, became a staging point for American forces intent on invading Canada. From the fall of 1775 through the summer of 1776, Americans converged on Lake Champlain as they ascended the waterways into Canada to confront British forces. After a series of disastrous defeats, crippling epidemics of small pox, and lacking supplies, in July of 1776, the Americans withdrew to Crown Point and Ticonderoga. This set the stage for a navel defense by General Benedict Arnold against British General Sir Guy Carlton’s fleet. Though Arnold was defeated, he was successful in stalling Carlton’s advance down Lake Champlain. The British withdrew to winter in Canada and the Americans continued to occupy Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga.

In 1776, British General John Burgoyne had arrived with reinforcements and commanded the Canadian land forces that drove the Americans out of Canada. He along with other officers were critical of General Carlton’s decision not to attack Fort Ticonderoga after General Arnold’s defeat. He returned to London that winter of 1776-77 and penned a detailed plan of operation for taking the fortifications along Lake Champlain and occupying Albany the following year. He was most persuasive in promoting it to politicians in high places, including King George the III, and was given permission to enact his plan. While in England, Burgoyne arranged the reinforcements for his invasion and set sail in the spring of 1777. To his satisfaction, he was able to convince London that he, and not General Carleton, should command this force. The goal was to hook up with General William Howe in Albany, who was to simultaneously bring his army north up the Hudson, thereby cutting New England off from the rest of the colonies.

Burgoyne’s Invasion Army

Burgoyne arrived in May and immediately arranged his invasion force. He was to divide his army into three units: a right wing to be made of all British regiments, a left wing of all German forces, and an Advance Corps commanded by Brigadier Simon Fraser. Fraser’s advance corps consisted of: Fraser’s own 24^th regiment (Maj. Robert Grant commanding), a grenadier battalionⁱ under Major John Acland, a light infantry battalion under Alexander Lindsay – 6^th Earl of Balcarres, 150 Canadian woodsmen, Ebenezer Jessup’s Kings Loyal Americans, Queen’s Loyal Rangers under John Peters, and a company of Canadian rangers led by Fraser’s nephew, Captain Alexander Fraser. The grenadier and light infantry battalions were among the finest troops in Burgoyne’s army; this array of approximately two thousand men constituted the best ‘strike force’ the British had to forge against any initial rebel resistance.

The rest of Burgoyne’s force consisted of a British right wing commanded by Major General William Phillips – First Brigade under Brigadier General Henry Watson Powell consisted of the 9^th, 47^th, and 53^rd regiments, the Second Brigade was led by Brigadier General James Inglis Hamilton and was made up of the 20, 21, and 62^nd regiments. The left wing was all German and was commanded by General Riedesel – First Brigade was under Brigadier General Johann Specht, with the von Rhetz, von Riedesel, and Specht Regiments; the Second Brigade was led by Brigadier General W. von Gall, who commanded the Prinz Friedrich and Hesse-Hanau regiments, plus an advanced corps under Lt. Colonel Heinrich Breymann, made up of jagers (riflemen) under Mqajor von Barner, horseless dragoons under Lt. Colonel Baum, and grenadiers also under Breymann.

To this array of forces was added 138 pieces of artillery from twenty four pounders to 4.4 inch mortars. General Phillips had overall command of the train of artillery which consisted of 250 British and 100 Hessian gunners plus an additional 150 British recruits as cannon cockers.ⁱⁱ Burgoyne had a total of 3,981 British troops and 3,116 Germans earmarked for his invasion down Lake Champlain. To guard and transport these many troops, including the Native American and Canadian forces, required a large flotilla of vessels. The largest was the Royal George, a 384 ton frigate with 26 cannon. The Inflexible was a three-masted man of war with 22 guns. There were the schooners; fourteen gun Maria (named for General Carleton’s wife) and the twelve gun Carleton. The Thunderer, a name usually reserved for bomb ketchesⁱⁱⁱ, was a radeau, a blunt and armored floating battery whose purpose was similar to a bomb ketch in which it was planned to pound Fort Ticonderoga to submission. Also added to the British weight of metal was the gondola Loyal Convert of seven guns. Also there were several newly constructed gunboats including those refurbished and captured from the Americans during the Battle of Valcour Island the previous year: the Washington, Lee, and Jersey. Over a hundred bateaux were put into use, rowed or fixed with one mast to take advantage of the wind. They were each capable of carrying thirty five soldiers who were ferried down the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain.

Captive Supplies Important Information

By June 20^th, all was ready and the British armada and transports departed St. Johns for Lake Champlain. General Fraser, in command of the advance corps, sent out parties of Native Americans and Canadian rangers to probe the American lines and bring in captives. They pushed south to Fort Ticonderoga and ambushed a party of workmen. As luck would have it, one of the captives was a former British soldier who had spent the winter on work details repairing the fort’s defenses. Under interrogations, James MacIntosh willingly indulged every detail of the fort’s design, improvements made by the Americans, and lay of the land surrounding the fort including strengths and weaknesses. He openly discussed the number of troops, workmen, and wagoneers (approximately 4,000 men in all), ships (2 galleys mounting twelve six pounders each) a gondola with two nine pound guns, and over 30 usable bateaux. He informed General Fraser of every aspect of the fort including gun placements, troop dispersal, outer-work construction and breastworks, (mainly along the old defenses the French had built to oppose the British in 1758), batteries, abatis, etc.

This was a windfall of information for the British; however one piece of information was to ultimately prove most devastating to the Americans. It was a section of the rebel defenses, southward and facing west, which MacIntosh described as being absent of cannon. It skirted Mt. Hope which was the main road to Lake George, but also was near Sugar Hill, a vacant hill top that had a clear view of both Fort Ticonderoga and Fort Independence newly built across the river.^iv Fraser would discover that this piece of real estate would hold the key to capturing Ticonderoga, forcing American General St. Clair to abandon the fort.

Also of importance, and what would lead to the Battle of Hubbardton – first major skirmish between Burgoyne and American forces, was MacIntosh’s answer when questioned about which direction reinforcements and supplies arrive. He said they came from the east, from Fort No. 4 (south of present day White River Junction, Vermont) on the Connecticut River. The road then cut west to Castle Town (present Castleton, Vermont). From there one could head south to Manchester and Skenesboro (present day Whitehall, New York), or north to Crown Point, with another road heading west to Fort Independence and Ticonderoga. This route would prove to be the exact road General St. Clair would take his army when he ultimately evacuated Ticonderoga.

American Preparations at Fort Ticonderoga.

By mid June, at the time Fraser’s advance corps was entering Lake Champlain, Major General Arthur St. Clair had returned to the Northern Army (as Colonel St. Clair, he had led a regiment during the previous years’ battle at Three Rivers), and given the command at Ticonderoga.^v When the Americans retreated to Ticonderoga in June of 1776, Colonel Anthony Wayne was left in charge of the fort when it became certain that General Carleton had abandoned his invasion south. Wayne and the troops stationed at and around the fort sustained themselves through a very harsh winter. Hardly a day passed without a fatality caused by sickness, exposure to the weather, and the primitive conditions of camp. In March, 1777, Wayne wrote to state and federal authorities. He warned of the imminent threat of attack by growing forces in Montreal and St. Johns and sought provisions and reinforcements: “For God’s sake, rouse your field and other officers from their lethargy… There is not one moment to spare.”^vi

May of the new year saw reinforces dribbling in – mostly militia. Because General Washington did not know if and when British General William Howe would strike out from New York, he could not spare the regular soldiers Wayne so desperately needed. Also, after the Danbury Connecticut Raid in late April, states were reluctant to send their militia north, opting to keep them home for protection against marauding British parties. By the time Wayne was replaced, the garrison at Fort Ticonderoga had shrunk to 2,200 men. Wayne had written about the instability of the “sunshine” soldier and large number of extended furloughs writing: “at least one third of the troops now on the ground are composed of negroes and Indians…”^vii So too had supplies been depleted and the troops once more faced severely reduced rations. The situation was critical. Unless more supplies and manpower reached the fort, its officers questioned if the fort could even withstand a week’s siege.

In June, 1776, Congress had assigned Major General Horatio Gates to command the army in Canada. He traveled north, assuming that he was to take over command of the Northern Army from the unpopular Major General Philip Schuyler. Schuyler immediately informed Gates that his commission specifically stated the army in Canada. Since there was no longer an American army in Canada, he had no command. This created a huge row between the two commanders. John Hancock, president of the second Congress only muddied the waters when he wrote that both gentlemen were to share the command. Eventually this feud worsened and intensified after the eventful loss of Ticonderoga. General Schuyler was blamed for the fort’s evacuation and the man with the most influence over Congress, Horatio Gates, prevailed. He learned that he was made supreme commander of the Northern Army just as Burgoyne’s forces drew closer to Albany.

British forces arrive at Crown Point Nine Miles North of Fort Ticonderoga.

On June 30^th, the main body of British and German troops had established their camp at the redoubt at Crown Point, evacuated by the Americans as the British approached. The wind shifted to the south and for over a week, the British fleet was held up in their advance on Ticonderoga. This did not stop the land forces from initiating plans to begin a siege and possibly cut off all supply and escape routes. Burgoyne split his army into two wings; General Riedesel and the Germans advanced up the east shore of Lake Champlain toward Mount Independence. They were to capture the road that led to Castle Town to the east and flank the Americans south, thereby trapping any and all rebel forces at the redoubt that was still under construction. Meanwhile, General Fraser, who was already at Three Mile Point, three miles distant below Crown Point, proceeded up the west bank of the lake toward Fort Ticonderoga to be followed by General Phillips. Fraser would act upon the information MacIntosh had given him. He would fan out to the west and capture the road through Mt. Hope which led to Lake George. He was to then swing south of the fort to seal off any and all escape routes in that direction.

Fraser discovers Fort Ticonderoga’s weakness – Sugar Hill.

The same day Fraser’s men established their position to the west of the fort, he discovered the importance of occupying what his maps labeled Sugar Hill^viii and which the rebels called Mt. Defiance. That afternoon, he dispatched Captain Craig with forty light infantry and Native American scouts to reconnoiter. By midnight, Craig was back; his report was promising. The next day, July 3^rd, around noon, Fraser and Lt. William Twiss, engineering officer, hiked up the mountain in “abominable hot” conditions. He saw that the position commanded both Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence, guessing at a distance of 1,400 yards and 1,500 yards respectively. This was within range of their cannon which could sweep the entire yards of both forts. Upon return to his headquarters, around 2 PM, Fraser ordered axemen to hack an abatis on the summit and begin carving a road to the top. Burgoyne and Phillips agreed “to use every possible expedition to get cannon to the top.” It was an incredible feat, but a road sixteen feet wide and three leagues long was built to the summit, more so as the uphill climb was “almost a perpendicular ascent.”

While the road was being built and cannon moved to the summit of Sugar Hill, the British forces would continue their advance east and south to cut off all escape routes from the forts, thereby entrapping the rebel army before they could realize the threat from Sugar Hill and enact an escape. Four hundred men and according to British Lt. William Digby, “most of the cattle belonging to the army” labored on the road all day, July 4^th in incredible heat, slowly inching two twelve pound cannon towards the summit. By noon on July 5^th, the job was done, a battery was constructed at the top, and the men received as a reward “a refreshment of rum.” However, the Americans had been alerted before the trap could be sprung.

General St. Clair Evacuates Ticonderoga.

Before the British had completed the road and battery, on July 5^th, a plume of smoke and what were obviously scarlet coats moving through the trees was detected about the heights of Mt. Defiance (Sugar Hill). The Americans realized that a battery was being constructed on the summit and indeed cannon were being hauled up the steep incline. Too late St. Clair realized that artillery on Mt. Defiance would be capable of raking both Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence, making both positions untenable. The writing was on the wall for both forts would ultimately be cannoned to oblivion. The garrison at Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence consisted of 2,089 rank and file fit for duty, 900 militia, 124 unarmed artificers (cannon cockers) and the sick and invalids numbered in the hundreds. Including the ships’ crews, there were approximately 4,000 rebels who faced the British force of over 7,000 well armed professionals, most fit for duty. If they were to remain and resist, every officer knew it was only a matter of time, and not much at that, when they would be forced to surrender the garrison. St. Clair decided quickly that an immediate evacuation was the only choice if the Americans wished to salvage their army and any supplies before all escape routes were severed. By noon on July 5^th, St. Clair ordered a full retreat. The ships and bateaux would be loaded with all the supplies that could be hauled in one day, including the sick and invalids, and sent up the lake to Skenesboro, hoping that the booms and chain strewn across the lake would halt the British ships long enough for the rebel vessels to make their escape. The army would cross the bridge to Mt. Independence and take the road to Castle Town in the “Grants”^ix before heading overland to Skenesboro and Fort Edwards.

German Forces are too Late to Cut off the Road East.

The American army made their hasty retreat the night of July 5^th. The road selected for the army’s escape led from Mt. Independence, into the “Grants” to a small settlement at Hubbardton, then through Castle Town before cutting back southwest to Skenesborough. Clutching the pathetically few belongings they had managed to grab before setting off in the darkness, the soldiers stumbled along, fearful of attack in the rear, but unable to move any faster than those in front on the narrow road.^x The morning sun on July 6^th promised another brutally hot day. By six o’clock that morning, four separate bodies of rebel troops were heading along the road as fast as they could. In the front was Colonel Enoch Poor’s Continentals, behind which the main body of St. Clair’s army, along with militia regiments tucked between the Continentals. Frenchman General Fermoy’s Continentals came next, spread out across the landscape in disorder. Colonel Ebenezer Francis of Massachusetts’ 450 man regiment, among the finest troops St. Clair had in his command, along with Colonel Nathan Hale’s 2^nd New Hampshire regiment^xi, constituted a rear guard and had remained at the forts to the last, sweeping through the encampments and rounding up straggles along the road who could not keep up with the main army. Many strategists agree, had the Americans not been forewarned of the British cannon on Sugar Hill (Mt. Defiance), they may have hesitated their retreat, giving General Riedesel the time to forge through the swamps and cut off the road to Hubbardton and Castle Town and forcing St. Clair to surrender his army.

Three or four miles in the rear of Colonel Francis’ rearguard, General Fraser led the charge, hot on the heels of the retreating Americans. He drove his grenadier and light infantry battalions relentlessly, along with two companies from the 24^th. Some distance behind him came General Riedesel who, in his haste, collected a company of Jager (riflemen) and eighty men from Breymann’s corps, leaving order for the rest of his regiment to follow along as soon as they could. The American rear-guard would defy orders to follow the main body of St. Clair’s army to Castle Town. Claiming they were too fatigued and it being to late to press on, the American’s would encamp near the small enclave of Hubbardton, in present day Vermont. Unknown to the Americans, General Fraser’s rapid pursuit would pull his men up within a few miles of the rebels. The aggressive highlander would not wait for his German reinforcement, and early the next morning, though outnumbered, he would attack. His decision to do so in what has been labeled The Battle of Hubbardton, almost ended in the first British defeat in General Burgoyne’s invasion.

Repercussions of St. Clair’s Decision

When word spread throughout the colonies that the “Gibraltar of the North” had been abandoned without a fight, the reaction was predictable. Most of Americans were shocked and dismayed with the news. New Englanders were aghast and distressed that General Burgoyne’s army was so callously allowed to press past America’s last stronghold north. They feared that British and Hessian troops had been unleashed on the communities of New England, this without even the slightest effort to stop them. All had feared the worst as news traveled that not only the forts were taken, but also the army itself was destroyed. There was no silver lining to be seen, at least not yet.

So too were the British and German rank and file amazed by the ease in which they took the fortifications. Hessian Johannes Schwalm wrote in his diary: “We were astounded when we caught sight of the place. There was one earthwork after another, each rising above the previous one, eleven to twelve in number. On the beach there was also one trench after another, and shores were studded with cannon… The artillery stretched all the way from the water’s edge right up to both the citadel [Ticonderoga] and Fort Independence [redoubt across the lake], one gun protruding above the other. The magazines – crammed with flour, meat, coffee, wine, porter beer, sugar, medicines, etc. – held stock in superabundance… If the enemy had made a truly determined effort to defend the post, we could not have taken it considering the fact that our army was too weak for the task of attacking so important a location…”

An amazed Washington was mixed with anger and confusion. He heard of the first filtered reports five days later on July 10^th and wrote to General Schuyler: “…the Revd. Mr. Allen adverts to some misfortune that had befallen Col. Warner’s party [Green Mountain Boys at the Battle of Hubbardton, July 6], than to a total defeat of our Army at Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence. If those posts were carried it must have been by assault, as the time between the 3^rd and 5^th was too short for it to be done by Blockade…” Two days later he heard more of the vacated fort and remained vexed; “I will suspend my opinion upon the propriety of this very extraordinary and sudden evacuation, until I hear something from Genl. St. Clair; for, in truth, it is altogether unaccountable.” That same day he penned a letter to Congress: “Confirms it most unhappily for us, in its fullest latitude. This event (the evacuation of our posts on the Lake) among the most unfortunate that coould have befallen us, is rendered more interesting by the manner in which it took place.” By the next day, July 13^th, Washington was worried. He wrote to General Putnam; “The more accounts we get, the more astonishing does the evacuation of the posts on the Lakes appear. What can have become of Genl. St. Clair and the Army? I wish we may have heard the worst…”

Ten days after the fort was abandoned, on the 15^th, Washington expressed his frustration and outrage in a letter to General Schuyler: “The evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence is an event of chagrine and surprise, not apprehended, nor within the compass of my reasoning. I know not upon what principle it was founded, and I should suppose it still more difficult to reconcile, if the garrison amounted to five thousand men, in high spirits, healthy, well supplied with provision and ammunition, and the eastern militia marching to the succour, as you mention in your letter of the 9^th to the Council of Safety of New York… this stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much…” Still by August 4^th, nearly a month after the fort was vacated, Washington still saw the worst case scenario in a letter to the NY Council of Safety: “The misfortune at Ticonderoga, has given a very disagreeable turn to our affairs, and has thrown a gloom upon the happy prospect, which the campaign, previous to that event, afforded.” And by August 21^st, with an improved situation and after events clearly in favor of the Americans, cooler heads were looking down the road for answers to why the fort was evacuated. Washington wrote to General Schuyler; “an inquiry be made into the reasons of the evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and into the conduct of the general officers who were in the northern department at the tie of the evacuation.”

St. Clair would be ridiculed for his decision to forfeit Ticonderoga and Mr. Independence without a fight, however time would prove the foresight of his actions. He did not have the supplies, ammunition, or manpower, to resist a protracted siege by a superior army. Over a thousand soldiers were sick and unfit for duty while the redoubt at Mt. Independence was far from finished. British forces had nearly surrounded his position while a large detachment approached the last possibility of retreat. Two thirds of his army were Continental soldiers, many having fought during the failed Canadian campaign the previous year. They were hardened veterans who St. Clair and his officers rightfully believed should not be sacrificed defending a post which could not be held. They would be needed to offer a strong defense, slowly giving ground as Burgoyne advanced further from his supply lines. St. Clair, in support of his decision, reported to Congress on July 14, 1777: “…I have made good a retreat from under the nose of an army at least four times their numbers, and have them now betwixt the enemy and the country, ready to act against them…” As it turned out, St. Clair was correct in assessment and retreat. The rescued army formed the core upon which American militia rallied and Burgoyne’s force was stopped and ultimately captured; at the hands of many of the same soldiers who had retreated three months previously.

This was not lost upon the officers who sat in judgment of St. Clair’s actions. Official charges would be brought against him at a Court Martial about a year later on August 25, 1778 at White Plains, New York. St. Clair did not base his defense on the fact that the British had beat him to the punch and placed artillery on a superior positon to rake both forts. Instead he pressed the need to salvage the army to fight another day. He was exonerated of all charges and vindicated for quickly abandoning the region before his army could be surrounded and withdrawing it to a new defensive position.

For more reading, check out Amazon Previews on great books on Fort Ticonderoga’s history and the northern battles that helped change the course of the American Revolution.

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FOOTNOTES